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About SmartNet 
The project SmartNet (http://smartnet-project.eu) aims at providing architectures for optimized interaction between TSOs and 
DSOs in managing the exchange of information for monitoring, acquiring and operating ancillary services (frequency 
control, frequency restoration, congestion management and voltage regulation) both at local and national level, taking into account 
the European context. Local needs for ancillary services in distribution systems should be able to co-exist with system needs for 
balancing and congestion management. Resources located in distribution systems, like demand side management and distributed 
generation, are supposed to participate to the provision of ancillary services both locally and for the entire power system in the 
context of competitive ancillary services markets.  
Within SmartNet, answers are sought for to the following questions: 
• Which ancillary services could be provided from distribution grid level to the whole power system? 
• How should the coordination between TSOs and DSOs be organized to optimize the processes of procurement and 
activation of flexibility by system operators? 
• How should the architectures of the real time markets (in particular the markets for frequency restoration and 
congestion management) be consequently revised? 
• What information has to be exchanged between system operators and how should the communication (ICT) be 
organized to guarantee observability and control of distributed generation, flexible demand and storage systems? 
The objective is to develop an ad hoc simulation platform able to model physical network, market and ICT in order to analyse 
three national cases (Italy, Denmark, Spain). Different TSO-DSO coordination schemes are compared with reference to three 
selected national cases (Italian, Danish, Spanish). 
The simulation platform is then scaled up to a full replica lab, where the performance of real controller devices is tested. 
In addition, three physical pilots are developed for the same national cases testing specific technological solutions regarding: 
• monitoring of generators in distribution networks while enabling them to participate to frequency and voltage 
regulation, 
• capability of flexible demand to provide ancillary services for the system (thermal inertia of indoor swimming pools, 
distributed storage of base stations for telecommunication). 
Partners 
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Executive Summary 
This deliverable is one in a series of three reports that are looking into regulatory aspects of 
implementation of methodologies and coordination schemes developed in the SmartNet project, with the 
aim to facilitate integration of significant levels of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) into the network 
and their participation in provision of AS at both transmission and distribution levels. This requires new 
market/trading architectures and operational arrangements that will affect networks at both 
transmission and distributions levels as well as the interface between these networks.  
The aim of the SmartNet project is to provide architectures for optimized interaction between TSOs and 
DSOs in managing the exchange of information for the acquisition of ancillary services (reserve and 
balancing, voltage regulation, congestion management) from DER located in distribution networks. The 
main project results include the technical-economic assessment of a set of five TSO-DSO Coordination 
Schemes (CSs) with their market architecture. This is done through the set-up of a new simulation 
platform and ad-hoc national scenarios at 2030 aimed at assessing the operation of the proposed 
schemes so as to feed a cost-benefit analysis. The five proposed CSs are: 
• Centralized AS market 
• Local AS market 
• Shared balancing responsibility 
• Common TSO-DSO AS market 
• Integrated flexibility market.  
The different coordination schemes all have specific benefits and attention points related to the TSO 
and/or DSO grid operation, other market participants and the functioning of the market in general. In 
addition, implementation of or transition from one to another Coordination Schemes will require a 
significant change in roles and responsibilities, which are assigned to the central market actors.  
As already mentioned, in order to carry out the technical-economic comparison of the different CSs, a 
large-scale simulator, has been developed to realistically model the behaviour of complex systems which 
include transmission and distribution networks, bidding and market processes, as well as fundamental 
physics behind each flexible device connected to the system. This simulator includes three main layers: 
• Market Layer – representing the mFRR market 
• Bidding Layer – representing aggregation and disaggregation processes 
• Physical Layer – physical network including controls and protections and aFRR regulation 
The main objective of this report is to present the regulatory trends and stakeholders’ position on several 
issues, which the project considers to be essential for the definition of a well-functioning TSO-DSO 
interaction. To facilitate this analysis, we have identified 25 main issues, here referred to as topics of 
interest, which are associated with solutions and assumptions implemented in each of the simulator 
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layers. These topics have been evaluated in a comprehensive screening study, based on more than 40 
different documents such as position papers, strategies, roadmaps and legislation/regulation (EU 
Directives, Network guidelines, national regulatory Decisions).  Table 1 presents a summary of the 
screening according to the defined topics of interest. 
Table 1 Summary of the screening study 
Layer Topic of interest Conclusion  
M
a
rk
e
t 
la
y
e
r 
Market sessions timeline Need for an overall harmonisation process across Europe. 
Energy to be traded in periods, which are at least as short as 
imbalance settlement (requirement of 15 min from 2025-
01-01). The trade should be moved as close as possible to 
operation. Non-discriminatory access to the markets and 
creation of level-playing field. 
Nodal market vs. zonal   Zonal organisation is the preferred model in Europe. The 
nodal pricing model allows incorporating bottlenecks into 
the pricing. This type of organization has been successfully 
applied at several markets in USA.  
Local congestion management 
by DSOs vs centralized TSO 
market 
DSOs and TSOs to be responsible for handling congestion in 
their respective grids. Balancing remains under TSOs 
responsibility. Rules for use of flexibility resources across 
grids need coordination with a clear framework. Centralised 
TSO market for procurement of resources is expected to 
have higher efficiency and liquidity, but an extension to 
distribution could prove computationally challenging. Local 
markets could, by contrast be illiquid and prone to exercise 
of market power.    
Prequalification of resources in 
distribution networks 
Prevailing position is that the “static” prequalification 
process in the distribution network should be replaced by a 
coordinated TSO and DSO process.  
Inclusion of constraints 
(device-related) from 
distribution grid bidders 
No present legal requirements for inclusion of device-
related constraints. Proposal for inclusion of certain 
requirements on portfolio-level are advanced by 
stakeholders.  
Operation of possible local 
market 
Several key stakeholders including ENTSO-E support 
creation of a single market place for balancing and solving 
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congestions, with that meaning that the different markets 
(and their relevant responsible) should work in a shared 
database in order to avoid double awarding of the same bid.  
Management of voltage 
constraints 
Voltage control is formally defined as non-frequency 
ancillary service and thus shall be allowed to be procured 
by DSOs in market-based manner (both active and reactive 
power can be used for voltage control). According to 
common report TSOs and DSOs should agree on voltage 
control parameters at the border of the networks.  
Availability of reserve capacity Legal requirements requesting separate procurement of 
balancing energy and capacity, separate procurement of up- 
and down regulation capacity. At present TSOs are 
responsible for conducting optimal reserve capacity 
provision through market-based methods (FRR+RR), short 
term. 
Relationship with previous 
markets 
In the recent European legislative documents [6]" the 
market participants shall be allowed to bid into balancing 
markets as close to real time operation as possible, and at 
least after the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time - at 
most 1 hour before the delivery", which means even shorter 
terms 
Pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-clear EU legislation and guidelines suggest using pay-as-clear 
pricing model. However, several EU countries are presently 
still adopting pay-as-bid. 
Optimisation criterion for 
electricity market design – 
maximization of social welfare 
vs. minimum activation costs 
Maximisation of the social welfare prevails even if some 
present real time markets, by contrast, minimize purchase 
costs of the needed services.  
Roles and Responsibilities in 
the context of the 
prequalification, procurement, 
activation and settlement of AS 
markets including 
observability 
Gradual evolving of roles and responsibilities, especially for 
DSOs, towards more active role. This for example includes 
managing the local flexibility resources to improve 
operational efficiency (voltage regulation) and solve local 
congestion. However, balancing market responsibility will 
stay in TSO hands as stated by the Clean Energy for all 
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European package.  
B
id
d
in
g
 l
a
y
e
r 
Ancillary services considered 
in the screened documents 
According to the EU Directive on common rules for IEM [5] 
"…ancillary service’ means a service necessary for the 
operation of a transmission or distribution system including 
balancing and non-frequency ancillary services but not 
congestion management". 
Possibility to create “virtual” 
copperplate bids vs nodal 
bidding 
The recast IEM regulation proposal (Clean Energy for all 
European package) highlights locational price signals, 
which are needed for efficient investment into zonal 
electricity model. No other information was found in the 
screened documents. Copperplate bidding favours trading 
whereas nodal bidding provides a more transparent 
dispatch, with less request of activating countertrade by the 
TSO. 
Possibility for bidding negative 
prices in AS Markets 
This is issue is not directly discussed on the screened 
documents. However, the tendency in energy markets is 
everywhere to enable negative prices to give signals also in 
case of excess of resources. 
Dimensioning of bidding zones Recast of Regulation for IEM defines that the bidding zone 
should be defined on the basis of long-term congestions in 
the transmission network, and the zones should not have 
structural congestions. The zones can be modified (splitting, 
merging and adjusting) but should be the same for all 
market time frames.  
Incentivisation mechanisms for 
RES vs price revelation in AS 
Market 
It is argued that larger installations of mature technologies 
should participate in the markets and phasing out of their 
subsidies is planned by 2030. 
Minimum bid size and 
resolution 
The screened legal documents do not define min size for the 
bids. Several stakeholders favour allowing smaller bids for 
supporting participation of RES in the ancillary services. 
The issue is to what extent this should be supported by a 
decrease of the minimum market threshold or rather by the 
set-up of aggregators for the small DER resources. 
P h Prioritisation of control traffic Regulation of Open Access to Internet allows traffic 
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(support for network slicing) - 
how prioritisation for ICT 
control traffic for energy 
system management is ensured 
so to guarantee secure system 
operation. 
management for control signals needed for distributed 
ancillary services as long as this does not reduce quality for 
other end-users. Otherwise, provision of these services is a 
subject to a number of conditions.  
Responsibilities and ownership 
of components and data 
New tasks and responsibilities require changes in the rules 
for data sharing among key market actors. However, an 
increase of data sharing is the natural consequence of 
increased coordination needs between TSO, DSO and the 
other market subjects. 
Energy supply for 
communication and ICT 
components (how to ensure 
sufficient power backup for 
ICT) 
The issue was not covered in the screened documents 
Remote controllability of DER The new Codes and draft standards define requirements for 
remote controllability of DER (new units above 1 MW). It is 
expected that these requirements will be extended towards 
smaller units.  
 
A general conclusion from the review is that EU regulations are not directly addressing several of the 
topics identified by SmartNet, i.e. crucial topics for large-scale utilisation of Distributed Energy Resources 
in ancillary services, as for example timing of the markets. Without common EU regulations different 
solutions will develop in the distribution areas, the most diverse and non-harmonized solutions will be 
implemented in agreement between DSOs and adjoining TSO (e.g. nation- or region-wise under influence 
of TSO). This will not necessarily hamper the utilisation of local flexibility in the transmission grids, but it 
will certainly make more difficult the development towards cross-border utilisation of distributed energy 
resources. 
The final conclusions and recommendations will be presented in deliverable D6.3.  
The preliminary impression is that hardly any of the present or proposed regulation is explicitly in 
contrast to the hypotheses at the basis of the SmartNet work. However, for one topic, the EU legislation is 
somewhat different with configuration of SmartNet coordination schemes. For incorporating bottlenecks 
into the pricing, SmartNet selected to use nodal market organisation for ancillary services, European 
architectures (unlike the US implementations) implement a zonal organisation. 
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When it comes to the stakeholders' opinions, currently the situation is that ENTSO-E suggests that all 
congestion management needs, both for TSOs and DSOs, should be fulfilled by a common bid submission 
process from providers of distributed flexibility resources [18] in document "Distributed Flexibility and 
the value of TSO/DSO cooperation". A common process will among other ensure liquidity of the market 
[18]. ENTSO-E supports a common centralized solution for three system and grid services: 
• For electricity balancing from Frequency Restoration Reserves and Replacement Reserves.  
• For internal or cross-border congestion management in the transmission network 
• For congestion management in the distribution network  
Disregarding the selected approach (centralised or not) it is advised by ENTSO-E  [18] that the market 
design should allow both DSOs and TSOs to set limitations and to activate flexibility resources based on 
the connection point of the resource as it is advised by ENTSO-E.  
On the other hand “TSO-DSO data management report1” [13]  mentions different points of attention 
coming from DSOs and TSOs, where DSOs are essentially concerned about possible misalignments of 
actions between TSOs, DSOs and other market players, which could lead to loss of control over the 
distribution grid and drive inefficient grid expansion. DSOs think that certain balancing actions could be 
delegated to them to procure balancing services on their network as a subsidiary activity to support TSOs 
(see page 15 in [13]). 
                                                                   
1 Common publication of ENTSO-E, EDSO for SmartGrids, Eurelectric, GEODE and CEDEC 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 12  
 
1 Introduction 
This deliverable is one in the series of three reports that are looking into regulatory aspects of 
implementation of methodologies and coordination schemes developed in the SmartNet project.  
Therefore, building on work related to evaluation of ancillary services, market architectures, ICT 
requirements and trials carried out as part of the SmartNet, the three reports seek to carry out the 
following analysis:  
• Summarize lessons learned from evaluation of new operational tools and market models 
proposed and tested in the SmartNet project 
•  Evaluate proposed market architectures and planning and operation strategies in 
relation to current EU and national regulation and roadmaps developed by main industry 
and research bodies 
•  Produce a set of regulatory guidelines that reflect learning outcomes of SmartNet 
project 
The main objective of this report is to present the regulatory trends and stakeholders’ position on several 
issues (called topics of interest), which the project considers to be essential for definition of well-
functioning TSO-DSO interaction.  
Additional evaluation of learning from the implementation or SmartNet coordination schemes, as well as 
policy recommendations will be discussed in the following related deliverables: 
• D6.1 "Conclusions from national tests/simulations and their evaluations", which will collect the 
project experience on the same issues 
• D6.3 "Policy recommendations to implement and/or overcome barriers and enable TSO/DSO 
integration”, which, which will conclude the work package and elaborate on the final guidelines 
and regulatory recommendations that result from the SmartNet project 
The ever-increasing integration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) constitutes a challenge for the pan-
European electricity system, both at the transmission and at the distribution levels. This was recognised 
by European Commission and National regulators, who looked for possible solutions to enable RESs 
connections so as to help with overall environmental goals over the last decade or so. In the initial phase, 
issues with integration were more often related to local connection networks, rather than an overall 
system operation. Solutions to those issues called for changes in management of RES operation, in 
particular at distribution levels, but also started to include utilisation of energy storage and demand side 
management that could help tackling the limitations deriving from network constraints. 
Further increase in DER connections has opened additional questions related to how to include them in 
electricity markets, and allow them, by offering flexibility, to participate in a provision of Ancillary 
Services (AS). Currently, AS services are mainly purchased from participants at the transmission level by 
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Transmission System Operator (TSO). However, DERs are also seeking to participate in TSO AS markets, 
but these trades can be hampered by constraints that may emerge at the distribution network level due to 
significant increase in a number of DERs, and their influence distribution network operation.  To resolve 
issues at the distribution network level it can be expected that local AS markets might be needed in the 
future, especially if number of DREs becomes very high. Current European and national regulations are 
starting to address some of the issues that are emerging with these new arrangements, and the main 
objective of this report is to present the regulatory trends and stakeholders’ position on several issues, 
which the project considers to be essential for definition of well-functioning TSO-DSO interaction. To that 
end, the deliverable makes a comprehensive screening of present and forthcoming regulation with 
respect to some key regulatory issues that were addressed in SmartNet or influenced in some way the 
work in the project.  
1.1 SmartNet in a nutshell 
Increased levels of DERs and their participation in provision of AS at both transmission and distribution 
levels, call for a more advanced dispatching management of distribution systems to transform 
distribution from a “passive” into an “active” system. Moreover, new market architectures must be 
developed to enable participation of DERs in energy and AS markets. New operational and trading 
arrangements will also affect the interface between transmission and distribution networks, which will 
have to be managed in a coordinated manner between TSOs and DSOs in order to ensure the highest 
efficiency, effectiveness and security.  
The aim of the SmartNet project is to provide architectures for optimized interaction between TSOs and 
DSOs and help manage the exchange of information for monitoring and acquisition of ancillary services 
(reserve and balancing, voltage regulation, congestion management), both at national level and in a cross-
border context.  
This section briefly outlines the main outcomes of the project - a set of novel coordination schemes and 
the simulator as well as assumptions which were made for development and assessment of these. 
  SmartNet coordination schemes 1.1.1
SmartNet proposes five coordination schemes (CSs), each presenting a different way of organizing the 
coordination between transmission and distribution system operators (TSOs and DSOs), when DERs 
participate in provision of ASs. Here, only a brief outline for each of the CSs is provided, while their 
detailed descriptions are provided and discussed in SmartNet deliverable D1.1  [50]. Furthermore, 
market aspects of the CSs are discussed in SmartNet deliverable D2.4 [49]. 
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Each of the CSs is characterized by a specific set of roles assigned to TSOs and DSOs with a comprehensive 
operational rules and market designs. The main differences between different CSs are related to how, and 
by whom, coordination of DERs’ participation in AS markets or local markets is managed.  
The five proposed CSs, developed within the SmartNet, are as follows: 
•  Centralized AS market model, (Figure 1), where the TSO operates a market for resources connected 
both at transmission and distribution levels, without involvement of the DSO.  
 
Figure 1 Coordination Scheme Centralized AS. Source: [56].  
• Local AS market model, (Figure 2) where the DSO organizes a local market for resources connected 
at the DSO-grid and, after resolving local grid constraints, offers the remaining flexibility bids to the 
TSO for participation in AS markets.  
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Figure 2 Coordination Scheme Local AS Market Model. Source: [56]. 
• Shared balancing responsibility model, (Figure 3) where balancing responsibilities are divided 
between TSO and DSO according to a predefined schedule. The DSO organizes a local market to 
respect the schedule agreed with the TSO while the TSO has no access to resources connected at the 
distribution grid.  
 
Figure 3 Coordination Shared Balancing Responsibility Model. Source: [56]. 
• Common TSO-DSO AS market model (Figure 4), where the TSO and the DSO have a common 
objective to decrease costs to satisfy the needs for resources by both the TSO and the DSO. This 
mutual objective could be realized by the joint operation of a common market (centralized variant) of 
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the dynamic integration of a local market, operated by the DSO, and a central market, operated by the 
TSO (decentralized variant).  
 
Figure 4 Coordination Common TSO-DSO Market Model. Source: [56]. 
• Integrated flexibility market model (Figure 5), where the market is open for both regulated and 
non- regulated market parties, which requires the introduction of an independent market operator to 
guarantee neutrality. 
 
Figure 5 Coordination Scheme Integrated Flexibility Market Model. Source: [56] 
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The different coordination schemes all have specific benefits and attention points related to the TSO 
and/or DSO grid operation, market participants and the functioning of the market in general. Main 
benefits and attention points for each scheme are summarized in the Table 2 
In addition, the feasibility of the implementation of each coordination scheme is very dependent upon the 
regulatory framework. As discussed in [50], Centralized AS market model is the most in line with current 
regulations. The other coordination schemes would require considerable changes with respect to roles 
and responsibilities of TSOs and DSOs. The implementation of a coordination scheme is also influenced by 
the national organization of TSOs and DSOs, e.g.  the number of system operators (both TSOs and DSOs) 
and the way they currently interact. In addition, the implementation of certain coordination schemes will 
have an impact on other markets, such as the Intraday markets. Dependent on the services offered in the 
AS market, and compared to the Intraday markets (IDM), these markets might be able to co-exist or 
alternatively, may need to be integrated. 
Table 2 Summary of the benefits and attention points for SmartNet Coordination schemes 
Coordination Scheme Benefits Attention points 
Centralized AS  
market model  
• Efficient scheme in case when TSO is 
the only buyer for the service 
• Having only one market is low in 
operational costs and supports 
standardized processes 
• The most in line with current 
regulatory framework 
• No real involvement of DSO 
• DSO grid constraints not always 
respected 
Local AS market model  • DSO has priority in using local 
flexibility 
• DSO actively supports AS 
procurement. 
• TSO and DSO markets for services 
are cleared sequentially 
• Local markets might be rather 
illiquid 
• Need for extensive 
communication between TSO 
market and local DSO markets. 
Shared balancing 
responsibility model 
 
• The TSO will need to procure a 
lower amount of AS 
• Local markets might create lower 
entry barriers for small scaled DERs 
• Total amount of AS to be procured 
by TSO and DSO maybe higher in 
this scheme 
• BRPs might face higher costs for 
balancing 
• Small local markets may not be 
liquid enough to provide sufficient 
resources for the DSO 
Common TSO-DSO  
AS market model 
 
• Total cost of AS for TSO and DSO are 
minimized 
• TSO and DSO make optimal use of 
each other 
• Individual cost of TSO and DSO 
might be higher compared to 
other schemes. 
• Allocation of costs between TSO 
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and DSO could be difficult. 
Integrated flexibility 
market model 
 
• Increased possibilities for BRPs to 
solve imbalances in their portfolio. 
• High liquidity and relative low prices 
due to large number of buyers and 
sellers. 
• Independent market operator 
needed to operate the grid. 
• Negative impact on the 
development and liquidity of 
intraday markets. 
• TSO and DSO need to share data 
with Independent Market 
Operator (IMO). 
 
 SmartNet simulator 1.1.2
A key part of the SmartNet is a large-scale simulator, which is developed to realistically model the 
behaviour of complex systems which include transmission and distribution networks, bidding and market 
processes, as well as fundamental physics behind each flexible device connected to the system. As 
illustrated in Figure 6 the SmartNet simulator comprises of three main layers, briefly describe below. 
The Market layer 
The core of the simulator is an optimization algorithm responsible for simulating the real-time balancing 
market clearing process. It is designed to manage large optimization problems including the constraints 
of all the networks and the different TSO-DSO interaction models.  Modelling in this layer includes: 
• Network representation - the market-clearing algorithm embeds a DC-power flow model for 
the transmission network and an approximated AC-power flow model (based on convexification 
of the AC power flow equations) for the distribution grid that includes complex voltages and 
powers [49] 
• Market products - typical multi-period and logical constraints of flexibility providers  
• Arbitrage opportunities - between cascading markets (i.e. day-ahead, intraday, AS market). 
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Figure 6 Structure of the SmartNet simulation platform  [55] 
The Bidding and dispatch layer 
The interface between the physical devices and the market (and vice versa) is simulated through 
aggregation and disaggregation processes aimed at optimally managing the available flexibility from 
many dispatchable devices. This is done in order to bid the flexible devices by submitting bids that reflect 
flexibility costs and other constraints of particular technologies while also taking into account the 
potential arbitrage between different markets.  
The Physical layer 
The basis of the entire simulator is represented by the physics of the system components. The complex 
behaviour/characteristics of each network (transmission and distribution), loads, generators and flexible 
devices (storage, electric vehicles etc) are simulated together with the automatic processes directed by 
grid operators (state estimation/forecasting, network asset management etc). The processes include 
voltage regulation, reactive compensation, aFRR and network protections. 
 SmartNet market dimensions  1.1.3
During the initiation of the project several important assumptions and decisions were made regarding 
the types of AS, their time-scales, as well as bidding and other technical parameters. These components 
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can be called market dimensions, and in many ways have influenced configuration of the project's final 
outcomes.   
Time-scales of AS considered: the SmartNet is not tied to a particular product (e.g. aFRR, mFRR), but 
the services would typically [57]:  
• Encompass product with the similar time-scale as mFRR/RR 
• Do not encompass aFRR (with update of setpoints every few seconds) or FCR (local controller) 
time frame due to timing reasons 
Considered services: balancing and congestion management at transmission (HV) and distribution level 
(MV), including voltage constraint at MV [55]. 
Timing Dimension - the project follows a generic approach to test combinations of important timing 
parameters: 
• Time horizon of the market (optimisation window, delivery period):  e.g. 30 min 
• Time granularity of the market horizon: e.g. 5 min  
• Market clearing frequency: e.g. 30 min (The shorter, the better, but limited by optimization 
problem complexity (market clearing duration) 
• Max Full Activation Time (FAT) of the product: e.g. max 10 min   
• Max clearing time = Max allowed time for market clearing algorithm to return the decisions: e.g. 
5 min 
• Gate closure Time (GCT): e.g. 15 min before delivery period starts (10 min FAT + 5 min market 
time) 
 
Figure 7: Timing Dimension for SmartNet. Source: [57] 
Bidding Dimension – a catalogue of market products is proposed, to allow all flexibility providers to be 
on a level playing field: 
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• Bids are energy offers/asks, defined by quantity/price pairs in their simplest form 
• Curtailable or non-curtailable bids 
• Extension to multi-period bids, when time horizon is larger than the time granularity 
• Complex bid constraints, including temporal constraints and logical constraints.  
Clearing Dimension - the functional objective of the market clearing is to minimize activation cost 
(avoiding unnecessary activations) 
Pricing Dimension - pay-as-clear chosen over pay-as-bid. Locational” Nodal” marginal price (LMP) has 
been chosen to remunerate bidders. 
• Potentially different prices for each network node (in the model), due to losses and congestions 
For detailed explanation of the above see [49].  
2 Methodology 
The main objective of this report is to present the regulatory trends and stakeholders’ position on the 
issues, which the project considers to be essential for definition of well-functioning TSO-DSO interaction.  
To facilitate this analysis, it was necessary to, first, decide which aspects of the project would be 
important and informative to evaluate against current or planned solutions outlined by various 
stakeholders. These are referred here as topics of interest and are described in detail in subsection 2.1.  
The second step was to decide on the documents that would be “screened” and against which defined 
topics of interest would be evaluated. Selection of regulators and stakeholders, as well as selection of 
their documents that are considered here is discussed in subsections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The aim of 
this evaluation phase is to indicate where the proposed SmartNet solutions stand compared to current 
and proposed solutions so to take DERs integration and realisation of the SmartGrids to the next level.    
2.1 Topics of Interest for the screening 
Under each of the three layers described above in the section on the SmartNet simulator, a set of topics of 
interest have been identified. These topics represent either some key assumptions made within the 
project, or/and some attributes, which can be directly or indirectly decisive for implementation of the 
project’s outcomes.  The structural overview for the topics of interest is presented in Figure 8. 
Presentation and discussion of main findings from screening of present regulation and stakeholders’ 
views is aligned with the corresponding topics of interests. The following Sections 2.1.1-2.1.3 briefly 
explain selection of the above-mentioned topics and their relevance to outcomes of SmartNet project. 
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Figure 8 Topic of interest for the screening 
 Topics of interest for the Market Layer 2.1.1
Market sessions timeline 
This topic covers configuration and layout of electricity market sessions especially related to timing and 
similar parameters. These issues are critical for definition, refinement and later introduction of 
SmartNet’s concepts, since implementation of the concepts will require certain compatibility, making 
alignment of the key parameters possible.  
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Nodal market vs. zonal   
The aim of this topic is to evaluate different views related to selection of the pricing mechanism for the 
Internal Electricity Market (IEM) in Europe, which has been one of the ongoing public discussions during 
the recent years.  SmartNet has chosen marginal pricing or “pay as clear” as the pricing approach for 
balancing energy (see Section 3.1.10 for more details). Since considered power system is not treated as a 
copper plate, network constraints, both at the transmission and distribution levels, have to be taken into 
account. Marginal pricing can be adapted to a system with network constraints in different ways [49],, 
including 
• Nodal approach where a price for flexibility is associated to the most granular level in our 
network representation i.e. to each node of the transmission and distribution grids 
• Zonal approach where a price for flexibility is associated to a zone covering different nodes; each 
zone can have a different price but the nodes in the same zone have the same price. 
Local congestion management by DSOs vs centralized TSO market 
The main issue to be evaluated is to what extent the DSOs are ready to carry out a local congestion 
management via a local market, and to what extent this market could be sufficiently liquid. 
Prequalification of resources in distribution networks 
Prequalification process refers to the process in which a trusted entity (e.g. network operator) verifies 
the compliance of a balancing capacity provider with the requirements set by the TSOs [6], which could 
be also extended to the DSOs. The intention has been to clarify presence of rules and regulations defining 
these processes, e.g. which actor, should be responsible to carry out this, and on basis of which rules. 
Inclusion of constraints (device-related) from distribution grid bidders 
The main intention of this topic has been to clarify complexities of bids at distribution level, i.e., types of 
constraints which a bidder at distribution level should be allowed to include. Since SmartNet introduces 
both intra-bid temporal and inter-bid logical constraints (for details see [49], it is necessary to evaluate 
how allowing for these complex bids relates to current or already proposed market solutions. 
Operation of possible local market 
The main question is whether the local market should be operated on a single-DSO level or by a common 
Market Operator?  One can observe that the DSO landscape across Europe is very diverse and fragmented. 
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Number of national DSOs varies from only few to more than 100 per country. In some cases, small-sized 
DSOs may have insufficient expertise to operate its own real-time market as well as limited liquidity.   
Management of voltage constraints 
Here the intention was to analyse to what extend the voltage constraints should be separately enforced or 
whether the market should take them into consideration.  
Availability of reserve capacity 
The rationale for this topic is related to definition of : reserve capacity which, according to [6], refers to 
“the amount of frequency containment reserves, frequency restoration reserves or replacement reserves that 
needs to be available to the transmission system operator”. This issue became relevant in Europe during 
the recent years due to several factors, including the growing share of the renewable generation thanks to 
various support schemes and stagnating demand due to energy efficiency measures and relatively low 
economic growth. As a consequence, the electricity prices have been falling, leading to less investments 
into conventional generation. Higher share of varying RES, combined with low investments in firm 
capacity, has raised concern about availability of capacity reserves, which would be sufficient to maintain 
liquidity of the AS market.  
Relationship with previous markets 
This topic reviews how the outcome of the Intra Day market should be related to the real-time markets, 
including AS markets. For example, the persistence of uncoordinated and heterogeneous Intra-day Gate 
Closure Time (GCT), between, but also within, bidding zones, can be an important barrier to the 
improvement of the liquidity level in intraday markets [53]. 
Pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-clear 
This topic reviews strengths and weaknesses related to two pricing alternatives: pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-
clear2.  
• The “Pay as bid” approach where the activated bids simply receive the price corresponding to the 
activated quantity in the bidding curve. This approach is simple and intuitive for the different market 
stakeholders. However, it does not give incentive for the market participants to bid using the real cost 
of flexibility, creating an economic distortion in the activation decision [49]. 
                                                                   
2 Use of terminology varies across different documents, so the project group assumes that term “marginal pricing” in case of 
balancing market means the same as “pay-as-clear”.   
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• The “Pay as clear” or “locational marginal price (LMP) approach” where the activated bids receive the 
same price per MWh, corresponding to the most expensive activated flexibility. This approach 
removes the risk of market participant bidding in terms of what they want to receive instead of in 
terms of their real cost of flexibility [49]. 
Optimisation criterion for electricity market design - maximization of 
social welfare vs. minimum activation costs 
There are two main choices for the market objective function, namely “minimization of activation costs” 
and “maximization of social welfare.” According to recommendations by ENTSO-E, SmartNet has chosen 
to use “maximization of social welfare” as the objective function for the Integrated Reserve market, see 
[49] for a detailed description. It is therefore relevant to evaluate this choice towards other options 
considered by different stakeholders in Europe. 
Roles and Responsibilities in the context of the prequalification, 
procurement, activation and settlement of AS markets including observability 
The intention of this topic is to assess the current and future regulatory considerations regarding TSO and 
DSO roles, which are specifically relevant to the scope of SmartNet project and in particular to provision 
of ancillary services. 
Ancillary services considered in the screened documents 
This topic summarises the ancillary services, which were included in the screened documents. 
 Topics of interest for the Bidding Layer 2.1.2
Possibility to create “virtual” copperplate bids vs nodal bidding 
This topic is related to comparison of two ways of organising market for ancillary services i.e. nodal 
market vs. zonal. It includes a consideration whether a trader should be entitled to consider a sort of 
portfolio of services in different locations, which could have certain distance between them and could 
have some bottleneck in-between. 
Possibility for bidding negative prices in AS Markets  
The intention of this topic is to assess incentives for involvement into the flexibility market. In case a 
generator offers energy for downward regulation, it has to buy back energy that it has already sold on the 
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previous markets. Thus, when the down-regulation price goes below the true generator’s cost, provision 
of this flexibility becomes profitable.  This is even more so if the price can be negative, increasing a the 
energy bought back at the flexibility market. 
Dimensioning of bidding zones 
Due to several reasons, explained above, SmartNet project has chosen nodal organisation of the market. 
Therefore, dimensioning of the bidding zones is not directly in the scope of the present study. However, it 
still worthwhile to consider this issue since it can provide us with an insight on the size of the potential 
bidding zones should be in order to allow traders to be flexible while still maintaining secure system 
operation.   
Definition of bidding products  
There are three types of the main market products (or bids), which have been proposed and implemented 
in SmartNet: the UNIT-bid, the Q-bid, and the Qt-bid (for more details see [49]). These complex bids can 
be used by market participants, such as aggregators, to leverage the flexibility from a portfolio of 
resources. One of the project’s deliverables [49] describes these resources in detail and the models used 
to represent them. The topic seeks to compare SmartNet bidding products with those proposed 
elsewhere, by other stakeholders. 
Incentivisation mechanisms for RES vs price revelation in AS Market 
This topic considers how the price regulation of the AS markets should exclude incentivisation, or to what 
extend the incentivisation should continue to exist, so no market distortions are created. 
Minimum bid size and resolution 
There are several opinions that in order to foster the participation of small units in balancing markets, 
and achieve more competitive balancing market, a smaller minimum bid size should be required. It is also 
believed that the aggregation of several units should be facilitated [53]. This topic considers therefore 
different positions   regarding minimum bid size and resolution.  
 Topics of interest for the Physical Layer 2.1.3
Prioritisation of control traffic (support for network slicing) 
The topic discusses how prioritisation for ICT control traffic for energy system management is ensured so 
to guarantee secure system operation. 
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Responsibilities and ownership of components and data 
Deployment of SmartNet's coordination schemes will require more active interaction between TSO and 
DSOs, which presumes new responsibilities and ownership of components, models and data.  
Energy supply for communication and ICT components 
This aim of this topic was to clarify how to ensure sufficient power backup for ICT and also discusses 
which parties are responsible for its provision. 
Remote controllability of DER 
This topic considers to what extent DER inverters and similar equipment will include the controllability 
and related remote-control interfaces needed by services considered in the SmartNet or other FRR type 
of ancillary services. 
2.2 Organisations issuing the screened documents  
The documents considered in this study have been issued by several types of stakeholders, including: 
• Governmental Organisations 
• Organisations working with different aspects of Regulation and Standardisation 
• Interest organisations as Industrial Associations and similar 
• Other 
The key stakeholders, which are considered in this study, are in many ways defined by implementation of 
the latest changes in the European legislation related to the internal gas and electricity markets i.e. the 
Third Energy Package (entered into force in 2009). The package established National regulatory 
authority (NRA) for each member state, and a common Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER). Following the same process, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-
E) was established in 2008 as a common body representing European TSOs. In the scope of the present 
document, ENTSO-E in fact has a twofold functional role. On one hand it operates as an organisation 
which represents interest of the Europeans TSOs, and on another it acts as regulatory body which 
develops the Network Codes (Guidelines). 
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Figure 9 Overview of the issuing organizations 
Even though establishment of a similar single organisation for the European DSOs has been suggested by 
the Clean Energy Package [6],  no such organisation exists yet at the time of this writing. Based on the 
available information it appears that at the moment that there are four active associations: EDSO for 
Smart Grids, Eurelectric, GEODE and CEDEC (see Annex 1, page 80 for more details). The foreseen tasks 
for the new EU DSO entity are as follows: 
• coordinated operation and planning of transmission and distribution networks; 
• integration of renewable energy resources, distributed generation and other resources 
embedded in the distribution network such as energy storage; 
• development of demand response; 
• digitalisation of distribution networks including deployment of smart grids and intelligent 
metering systems; 
• data management, cyber security and data protection; 
• participation in the elaboration of network codes 
The screening includes a document from European Technology & Innovation Platform - Smart Networks 
for Energy Transition (ETIP-SNET) [3], an organisation that superseded The European Electricity Grid 
Initiative (EEGI).  
2.3 Selection of documents for the screening  
The study considered the main outcomes of SmartNet project, based on two dimensions:  
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• Stakeholders’ views or Replication, which denotes the property of a system that allows it to be 
replicated at another location or time [48]. The study looks how outcomes of SmartNet project 
(see SmartNet deliverable D6.1 [63]) will comply with the overall position and opinions of the 
key stakeholders, which are expressed via position papers, roadmaps and similar indicative 
documents. These documents show whether the given stakeholders may accept and even 
endorse SmartNet's outcomes, and how challenging it may be to replicate these across Europe 
including which barriers will have to be overcome.  
• Regulatory alignment, which shows how SmartNet aligns with the regulatory framework that 
has already been implemented or/and has been suggested for the implementation within a 
certain number of years. It also aims to give an indication on the potential time frame for certain 
measures, solutions and outcomes. For this purpose, the study looks into legislative and 
regulatory documents, although it should be noted that regulation in general is not something 
static, but a constantly evolving process, required for a gradual step-by-step achievement of 
certain global targets. 
Table 3 Dimensions of the screened documents 
Dimension Source documents 
Stakeholders’ views (Replication) Position papers 
Roadmaps 
Other 
Regulatory alignment (Evaluation) Legislation 
Regulation 
Strategies 
 
The project evaluated all together more than 40 documents, provided in the References section on, page 
74. This document also includes brief summaries for each of the screened documents, which are included 
in Appendix 6.1” Overview of the studied documents (summaries). 
2.4 Limitations of the study 
There are many interlinked political discussions in the energy domain, which are ongoing at different 
institutional levels in Europe today. Since the present study has a limited scope to present the regulatory 
trends and stakeholders’ position on selected, above defined, topics of interest, it was necessary to make a 
representative selection of documents, showing position of different involved parties i.e. stakeholders.  
The working group for the present activity has observed that some of the documents indicate more or 
less continuous decision-making process, where several significant corrections were added after release 
of the document. In addition to this, one can argue that some stakeholders have been adjusting their 
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position over time. Therefore, the present views or the current screening is based on the state of the 
discussion (documents) at the time of this writing.  
Some of the considered documents belong to regulatory or restructuring processes with different time 
horizons, e.g. some refer to a specific issue in the certain period of time, while others represent a step-
wise long-term process. Therefore, some of the statements or positions may simply indicate different 
steps in a similar process. Also, there may be certain divergence in implementation of the Pan-European 
legislative acts on national levels.  
Moreover, the study concentrated on the documents, which are both official and publicly available. 
Finally, whenever possible the study sought to use terms and definitions from official public documents, 
as for example European Directives and Network Guidelines. 
3 The screening study 
The following sections were prepared using a common step-wise structure, which included: 
• Step 1: Overview of the present or/and proposed (not fully implemented yet) legislative acts and 
definitions using the European Directives, Network Codes/Guidelines etc. as sources.  
• Step 2: Summary of the stakeholders' opinions have been mapped by using roadmaps, position 
papers and similar. as sources 
• Step 3: Reference to the present situation (i.e. status quo), which refers to the existing practices and 
prevailing regulatory documents 
• Step 4: Conclusions and reference to SmartNet’s Coordination Schemes, when applicable 
Several topics are somewhat interrelated, therefore some of the points can be mentioned repeatedly in 
the description. Each topic is first introduced with a brief rationale, outlining its importance, which is 
then followed by a discussion and relevance to the SmartNet project.  
3.1 The market Layer 
 Market sessions timeline  3.1.1
At the time of this writing the latest Proposal for a recast of the Internal Electricity Market Regulation 
provides several key principles for the organization of the market sessions [6], including the following: 
Market Operators (MOs) on the Day-ahead Market (DAM) and IntraDay Market (IDM) shall provide the 
opportunity to trade energy in time intervals, which are at least as short as the imbalance settlement 
period at these two markets. It also defines that from 2025-01-01 the imbalance settlement period should 
be 15 minutes in all control areas. This means in practice that from 2025 energy will be traded in 15 min 
or shorter time intervals.  
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In documents additional to "Clean Energy for all Europeans" [9], it is stated that the trade should be 
allowed as close to the real time as possible, and at least after intraday cross-zonal gate closure - at most 
one hour before delivery. Specifically, for DAM [7] the gate closure time (GCT) is defined as a market that 
closed at noon the day before. Therefore, the EU is providing a guideline on the maximum time for trade. 
In this sense, they are setting the upper bound, while the lower bound is to be decided by the involved 
stakeholders based on the current context and objectives.  
According to the European Commission [6], the contracting of the balancing capacity should be done at 
least one day before provision of the balancing and the contracting period should be maximum one day. 
In Guidelines on electricity balancing, [15], the time period for imbalance settlement on balancing 
markets is defined as 15 minutes. This is related to the overall harmonisation process in Europe, which 
will support trading on IDM and development of trading products with a similar time window. This 
means that both settlements are being harmonized - DAM/IDM and balancing. 
It is difficult to observe very specific opinions from stakeholders, when it comes to organisation and 
timing of the markets. Both ENTSO-E [18]  and WindEurope [14] share position on the necessity to create 
a level playing field, to ensure non-discriminatory access to all interested providers and in particular 
when it comes to separate procurement of up- and down-regulation, which is clearly favourable for some 
of the existing technologies. WindEurope also refers to the design of products with short duration and 
high granularity as target [14] , [42] in order to increase participation. In addition, WindEurope supports 
moving GCT for balancing markets as close as possible to real time delivery and reducing the lead time for 
procurement of balancing capacities since it will encourage involvement of wind power generators. In 
fact, this complies with the proposal for the recast of IEM regulation [6], which was made more general 
(i.e., not technology-specific). 
Comparing the existing practice in Nordic Countries, Spain and CWE (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands), the GCT for DAM complies with the above-mentioned requirement of 
12:00 (D-1). The IDM in Spain has six discrete trading sessions, the Italian IDM is divided into seven 
sessions, while the NordPool applies continuous auction until H-1. In general, across Europe there are 
two designs: discrete and continuous auctions for IDM. Continuous auctions are mostly used across 
Central and Northern Europe, while discrete is used in the Iberian Peninsula and Italy.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
In order to have a compromise between fast reaction and computational effort, SmartNet has proposed a 
market with a clearing frequency of 15 minutes [49]. It is assumed that within the time step both market 
clearing and counter-trading are taking place [49].  This time step duration is not definitive (as it is a 
market parameter) and can be potentially adjusted to help with an implementation of algorithm, if 
necessary.  Note that the common European requirement for the imbalance settlement will be 15 min. as 
of 2025.  In some European countries it is already so, as for example in Italy. 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 32  
 
 Nodal market vs. zonal 3.1.2
The network constraints, both at the transmission and distribution levels, are of key importance for an 
ancillary service market ensuring the satisfaction of congestion and voltage constraints. It is therefore 
natural to encompass these network factors in the price mechanism in the most accurate and 
economically efficient way. Moreover, ancillary service markets are close-to-real-time market and their 
outcomes cannot be corrected by a market afterwards. The nodal pricing model incorporates bottlenecks 
into the pricing. For these reasons, a nodal approach is proposed to be considered for the Integrated 
Reserve market design [49].  
Several legal documents refer directly to zonal organisation as model for electricity system in Europe. 
This includes the latest recast of Regulation [6] mentioning zonal electricity system in several instances 
and defining principles for setting bidding zones (i.e. structural congestions) presuming that this is an 
agreed or preferred model. The Network Guidelines [7] , [15] also stipulate that the pricing mechanism 
for DAM and IDM is zonal. In [6] it is also highlighted that in a zonal electricity system, locational signals 
must be provided, as the signals allow the determination of bidding zones, which reflect structural 
congestion. 
The Recast Electricity Regulation [6] highlights that, in order to support a zonal electricity system, correct 
locational signals are required to ensure efficient network operation and planning. The correct locational 
signals need reliable definition of bidding zones, which could reflect congestions. The Electricity 
Balancing Guideline [15] focuses on establishing the rules on electricity balancing markets. Moreover, the 
statements regarding cross-zonal electricity system in [15] align with that in [6].  
The Nordic and Spanish electricity markets are zonal and both the wholesale and the AS market in Spain 
are zonal [26, 27, 28, 29]. The zone of the Spanish electricity market is defined as the whole peninsula. 
Please note that there are exceptions (i.e. definition of smaller zones) in the Spanish electricity market. In 
the case of automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR) [27] and [28], this service is provided by 
the regulation/control zones, which is a group of generator units qualified by the system operator (Red 
Eléctrica de España). For technical restrictions identified by the system operator, which imply 
increase/decrease of generation schedule, the system operator will select the most economical solution 
available for each specific technical restriction [29]. 
It is confirmed in [7] that the pricing mechanism for both day-ahead market and intra-day market is 
zonal.  In the Spanish wholesale electricity market, marginal price is used for clearing day-ahead and 
intra-day market [26], [27] and [28]. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
As the network constraints, both at the transmission and distribution levels, are of key importance for an 
ancillary service market ensuring the satisfaction of congestion and voltage constraints, it is natural to 
encompass in the price mechanism these network factors in the most accurate and economically efficient 
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way. The selected nodal organisation of the market allows SmartNet to resolve two different issues at the 
very same time – "balancing + congestion".  
For these reasons, a nodal approach is proposed in SmartNet for the considered Integrated Reserve 
market to be designed [49]. In addition, through the experience of SmartNet simulations, it has been 
observed that in most cases nodal market has provided good solutions.  
 Local congestion management by DSO vs centralized TSO market 3.1.3
The European Commission states in [6] “DSOs can use flexibility to improve efficiencies in the operation 
and development of the distribution system, including local congestion management". According to recast 
of the Directive on common rules for the internal electricity market [5], " many DSOs are part of vertically 
integrated companies, which are also active in electricity supply business". Therefore, regulatory 
safeguards are necessary to guarantee the DSOs’ neutrality in their new functions, e.g. in terms of data 
management and when using flexibility to manage local congestions. One of the key issues, related to this, 
deals with electrical storage facilities. The European Parliament states in “The Common rules for the 
internal market in electricity” [5] that TSOs shall not be allowed to own, manage or operate energy 
storage facilities, and shall not directly own or indirectly control assets that provide ancillary services. 
Furthermore, DSOs shall not be allowed to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage facilities. The 
very same document opens, however, several possibilities for derogation, when certain conditions are 
fulfilled. This includes, for example, cases when no other actors were interested to own and operate 
storage facilities through an open tender procedure. Exemptions can be also given by regulatory 
authorities after assessing necessity for such derogation.  
Looking at this issue, from the stakeholders’ point of view, The European Distribution System Operators’ 
association for Smart Grids (EDSO4SG) suggest that DSOs could own and operate storage facilities for 
security and quality of service (QoS) reasons [10]. EDSO4SG in general advocates for DSOs a possibility to 
deploy, own and operate grid-scale network storage assets, but for technical/network operation 
purposes only (incl. emergency situations, maintenance, voltage limits preservation and reactive power 
control management). 
The European Technology and Innovation Platform (ETIP) in its Research and Innovation (R&I) Roadmap 
2017-2026 [3] for Smart Networks for Energy Transition foresees that TSOs will be responsible for the 
overall system reliability, while DSOs will keep managing congestions in their local grids [3] with the 
request/requirement to coordinate the real-time congestion management between TSOs and DSOs. 
Furthermore, the document suggests a single market place for balancing and congestion management.  
Also, EDSO4SG states that DSOs should be allowed to procure system flexibility services not only through 
market-based solution. In contrast, EDSO advocates for DSOs to deploy, own and operate grid-scale assets 
for technical operation purposes only.  
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Reference [13]  developed by CEDEC (the European Federation of Local Energy Companies), EDSO for 
smart grids, ENTSO-E, EURELECTRIC and GEODE (association for European independent distribution 
companies of gas and electricity) highlights different views of TSOs and DSOs in terms of balancing 
actions. DSOs agree that some balancing actions can be devoted to them to procure balancing services on 
their network to support TSOs, while TSOs argue that balancing should be managed on a wider scale 
because local balancing cannot ensure overall optimisation of the system balancing. 
Similarly, to the previous reference, [16] is a cooperation document between ENTSO-E, Eurelectric, EDSO, 
CEDEC and Geode and specifies that TSOs and DSOs are responsible for congestion management in their 
grids respectively. However, the cooperating parties in the joint document do not take any specific 
position related to how solutions can be implemented. The document says that procedures for congestion 
management at distribution level should be developed and integrated with other market aspects of the 
current markets design at that level. They suggest that DSOs and TSOs could investigate possible options 
for coordinating the use of flexible resources across both grids. The two options proposed are a single 
market place or local congestion markets with high level coordination between TSOs and DSOs.  
ENTSO-E proposes to increase the scope of the EU legislation in the Guideline on System Operation by 
allowing limitation to be set not only on balancing bids but also on congestion bids, considering the 
geographical location of the bidding asset. The latter is also supported by USEF [35]. ENTSO-E supports 
inclusion of locational information in bids or internal schedules within an aggregation [18] and [22]. 
ENTSO-E also suggests that the Single flexibility marketplace collects bids (with locational information) 
for balancing and congestion management processes. In this marketplace, bids could be different, or it 
could refer to both (diluting the distinction between balancing and congestion) [22].  
CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators) is not specific in its position, presented in the document 
“CEER Position paper on the future DSO and TSO relationship” [25], about how local congestion 
management shall be conducted/organised in the future. 
WindEurope advices in [14] that DSOs should be enabled to solve local congestions at distribution level 
by procuring and activating eligible resources to participate to the markets. However, WindEurope does 
not support formation of local flexibility (DSO) markets which they consider inefficient and limited [14].  
In the same vein, it should also be mentioned that measures to avoid negative impacts on the distribution 
grid are required for an efficient operation. A measure could be the introduction of a traffic light system 
similar to the one, proposed by USEF in [36]. 
Conclusions with reference to SmartNet 
The discussion on the European level regarding local DSO vs system wide TSO congestion management is 
still open. DSOs appear to be in need of flexibility, and this is recognised and supported by the recast IEM 
Directive. Mechanisms that could enhance the current procurement of flexibility (either via common 
procurement or via market at each grid level) and the framework (since DSOs are regulated entities) for 
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the recognition of costs i.e. incentives for participation in such mechanisms, are still missing. The overall 
impression is that even when DSOs may take local responsibility for congestion management or/and 
voltage regulation, these are not intended to cope with balancing, which will remain under TSOs’ 
responsibility. In this sense, SmartNet solutions provides a gradual and modular approach to the 
implementation of congestion management that fits the different stages of national markets.  
 Prequalification of resources in distribution networks 3.1.4
Recast of the Regulation [6] makes a general definition of prequalification (see above). It also stipulates 
that the procurement shall be organised in a non-discriminatory way between market participants in the 
prequalification process, either individually or through aggregation, while post-qualification is not 
mentioned. Furthermore [15] defines that each balancing service provider (BSP) intending to provide 
service, should pass the qualification process defined by TSO and, if necessary, by DSO.  
Currently, only TSOs are able to procure flexibility services from resources directly connected to the 
distribution networks. For the balancing services connected to the distribution network and offered to 
the connecting TSO, the border between distribution and transmission network is monitored and 
managed by a pre-qualification process carried out by a DSO [24].  
Most of the stakeholders’ opinions [16], [18], [22] and [25] on pre-qualification  process in distribution 
network suggests coordinated TSO and DSO process, while there exists a view from USEF [36] that 
recommends the pre-qualification process to be carried out by aggregators at portfolio level.  
The General Guidelines report [16] and the CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators) position paper 
[25] have the same suggestion. They recommend that TSOs and DSOs jointly define technical 
requirements for new technologies and ancillary services connected at the distribution network. They 
also emphasise DSOs need to ensure services quality in their network.  
The Guideline on System Operation advocates for TSO and DSO coordination to enable delivery of 
reserves at distribution level. Also, it expects TSOs and DSOs to define limitations on balancing bids, 
during pre-qualification or before activation, in order to avoid security issues in their respective 
networks.  
WindEurope [14] considers DSOs as responsible for ensuring coherence between ancillary services and 
distribution network constraints. Both TSOs and DSOs are regarded as market facilitators, and they 
should coordinate to activate flexibility resources through market signal/system operator’s activation or 
direct activation by the system operator. Efficient data exchanges are important to achieve this 
coordination, so that curtailment of Distributed Generators (DGs) and redispatching cost could be 
minimised. 
In order to enable coordinated process between TSOs and DSOs, data management and exchange is a 
critical part. The TSO–DSO data management [13], produced by both EDSO and ENSO-E, recommends that 
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each TSO develops an agreement with its connecting DSOs. The agreement includes information exchange 
required for the pre-qualification process of reserves located in distribution networks. These reserves 
include frequency containment reserve (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR), and replacement 
reserve (RR). The European University Institute research [24] has a very similar view with [13] that TSOs 
will need to define the information exchange terms and set up an agreement with its connecting DSOs, for 
the pre-qualification process for FCR, FRR, and RR. In addition, [13] also specifies that pre-qualification 
should not lead to grid limitations for those unconstrained networks. 
USEF’s work [36] concentrates on potential aggregator models that enable the integration of explicit 
Demand Response (DR) (i.e. incentive-based DR). In the example of aFRR (automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserve), it is assumed that this service is delivered from a group of aggregated assets by the 
aggregator. Part of the TSO contract phase with aFRR is a pre-qualification process. The pre-qualification 
phase can be done either at individual level or at portfolio level. It is the aggregator’s responsibility to 
register its portfolio, so the relevant DSOs are aware of DR availability in its distribution network. 
Therefore, USEF recommends allowing pre-qualification to be carried out by aggregators at portfolio 
level, so that the amount/type of flexibility resources participating in various markets can be increased. 
There is no explicit mentioning of pre-qualification process in the EDSO position paper [10]. However, it 
is emphasized in the paper that DSOs are free to choose the way of procuring flexibility. Guideline on 
Electricity Balancing [15] requires each DSO to provide essential information associated with pre-
qualification to its connecting TSO in due time for performing imbalance settlement, this is to ensure 
efficient and effective system balancing in a coordinated way. 
In Spanish ancillary service markets, two criteria need to be met before the participation, which are: 1) 
pass pre-qualification test by the TSO (Red Eléctrica de España); 2) minimum bid size of 10 MW, can be 
the aggregated bids. For the instance of aFRR participation, the tests are established for the 
corresponding operation procedures. Mandatory information must be sent to the system operator by the 
service provider. The State Secretary of Energy defines the criteria for the type of technology which may 
provide ancillary services. Furthermore, before the participants connect to the market operator’s (OMI-
Polo Español S.A.) computer system, the market operator could verify whether the technical requirement 
for the participation has been reached, by suggesting and carrying out several tests. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
To summarise the above, screening indicates two main topics of the discussion: 
• Which actor (-s)/role (-s) should be involved into the pre-qualification process i.e. TSO, DSO 
individually or in coordinated manner or aggregator  
• What should be the qualification level i.e. individual or portfolio (mainly discussed in the USEF’s 
work [36], Section 6.7)  
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It is proposed in SmartNet that the process of pre-qualification could include two separate processes, 
which are technical pre-qualification and system pre-qualification. The technical pre-qualification process 
checks if a unit is qualified to participate in Ancillary Service (AS) market. In SmartNet, DSO is responsible 
for the system pre-qualification process in all Coordination Schemes (CSs). 
In the system pre-qualification process, DSO validates if the participation of flexible resources at 
distribution network will impose any local grid constraints. For example, in Coordination Scheme (CS) A – 
centralised AS market model, a separate system pre-qualification process could be carried out to 
guarantee that activation of flexible resources at distribution network by TSO will not cause additional 
distribution network constraints.  
 Inclusion of constraints (device-related) from distribution grid bidders 3.1.5
The present legal documents emphasise non-discriminatory approach [6] that will ensure adequate 
competition based on a level-playing field between market participants, including demand-response 
aggregators and assets located at the distribution level. However, no mandatory requirements related to 
inclusion of device-related constraints have been identified. The existing regulation in Spain provides 
certain mandatory requirements for the connected devices and in particular power factor [31] and [32].  
ENTSO-E supports homogenous access to the market from all participants [18]. Furthermore in [35] 
various stakeholders argue that requirements should be applied explicitly on portfolio level as for 
example: 
• Ramping rate up and down 
• Sustain requirement 
• Single side flexibility  
• Availability requirements 
• Activation frequency 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
Regarding to SmartNet, it can be concluded that there are no legal requirements for inclusion of device-
related constraints. Proposal for least requirements on portfolio level from several stakeholders has been 
suggested in the framework of Open Networks Project [35].  
 Operation of possible local market (single DSO vs common distribution 3.1.6
Market Operator) 
The (recast) Directive on common rules for the internal electricity market [5] advocates that regulatory 
framework in Member States should give incentives to DSOs to use flexibility services to improve 
operational efficiency and distribution network development, e.g. congestion management at distribution 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 38  
 
level. It is also recommended in [5] that DSOs shall procure the flexibility services via market-based 
procedures. 
The 10-year R&I roadmap [3] reviews the coordinated activities between TSOs and DSOs proposed in 
[15]. The coordinated activities include accessing resources, grid visibility and data, and regulatory 
framework. Based on these coordinated activities, one of the benefits is enabling market players to 
provide flexibility services through bidding in a potential single market place. The purpose of the single 
market place is to manage bids for balancing and solving congestion. ENTSO-E in [18] and [22] explains 
the above proposed single marketplace in more detail, for the purpose of integrating Distributed 
Flexibility Resources (DFR). The single marketplace could be applied to collecting and selling DFR 
services, by allowing DFR service providers to bid in the single marketplace. Both TSOs and DSOs can 
access the bids and use the bids for balancing and congestion management based on their respective 
Merit Order Lists (MOLs). TSOs will also forward balancing bids to European-wide MOL for mFRR 
(manual Frequency Restoration Reserves) and RR (Replacement Reserves) in the common European 
balancing market. The bids can be the same or different for balancing and congestion management. In 
addition, to be used for congestion management, the bids would include locational information. The DFR 
bids can be activated directly by the system operators or by the market. In addition, ENTSO-E also 
emphasizes that DSOs should avoid acting as intermediate entities between TSOs and the connecting DFR. 
The proposed single marketplace could ensure market liquidity by allowing service providers to bid, 
allowing coordinated activities for balancing and congestion management and minimise the bidding 
processes. 
Day-ahead and intraday market operation with capacity allocation is discussed in [24]. It mentions that 
the CACM (Capacity Allocation & Congestion Management) Guideline introduces Nominated Electricity 
Market Operator (NEMO), which is a new entity (or role) to perform tasks of day-ahead or intraday 
market. Market Coupling Operator (MCO) is also introduced to match orders of day-ahead or intraday 
market from different bidding zones and allocate cross-zonal capacity. This is based on the requirement 
stated in the CACM Guideline, which requires TSOs couple and operate markets through power 
exchanges. 
To realise the integration of demand response, USEF in [36] and [43] recommends a Market Coordination 
Mechanism (MCM), which sits on top of the existing market models. The MCM allows all market 
participants with equal access, therefore, it delivers flexibility services with no limitations and 
customizations. The aim of the proposed MCM is to optimize the flexibility value, by enabling the 
flexibility trading across all roles in the energy system. 
Referring to today’s practice, the common Nordic market for balancing power does not have a dedicated 
Market Operator at the moment but is operated by national TSOs.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet’s schemes 
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An important difference between SmartNet’s coordination schemes is whether a centralized or 
decentralized architecture is considered. The following Table 4 shows which architecture is used in each 
coordination scheme. 
Table 4 Types of architecture applied in SmartNet coordination schemes 
Centralized architecture Decentralized market architecture 
Centralized AS market Local AS market 
Common TSO-DSO AS market (centralized) Common TSO-DSO AS market (decentralized) 
Integrated flexibility market Shared balancing responsibility model 
 
From screening of the relevant documents, it appears that creation of a single market seems to be the 
dominating opinion, supporting three SmartNet’s coordination schemes, as shown in Table 4  
 Management of voltage constraints 3.1.7
The recast Directive on internal electricity market [5] defines the steady state voltage control as one of 
the non-frequency ancillary services. Moreover, it points out that the non-frequency ancillary services 
shall be allowed to be procured by DSOs in a transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based manner. 
With the growth in the penetration of DER, the European ENTSO grid connection codes and related 
international IEC standards [21] will increasingly require DGs, Battery Energy System (BES), and micro 
grids to have capabilities to change their active and reactive power outputs, so to help with local voltage 
control. Currently, possibilities to control active and reactive power outputs directly and via droop 
settings are included in the draft standards.    
The 10-year R&I roadmap [3] mentions that TSOs are responsible for the security and stability of their 
respective networks, including the system interconnections with other transmission networks. Ancillary 
services are used by TSOs to manage network, frequency and voltage control. It is proposed in [3] that 
new ancillary services coming from Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and Distributed Generators (DGs) 
could be procured to enhance the current ancillary services’ procedures and strategies. To increase the 
integration of small (mainly PV) and medium Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) at distribution 
network, the roadmap [3] urges the need for automatic monitoring and control system that will help 
DSOs to better operate their network and maintain power quality at large scale. 
When it comes to network planning, voltage control is part of this analysis. The TSO-DSO data 
management report [13] recommends that TSOs and DSOs should agree on the voltage control 
parameters at the border between the TSO and the DSO networks. To maintain these agreed parameters, 
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DSOs should be able to use its reactive power sources and to carry out voltage control instructions to 
large users connected to its distribution network. 
In the Spanish electricity system [32], voltage control services are provided by generators (net power > 
30 MW (ordinary regime) or > 5 MW (renewable, cogeneration, wastes)) connected to the transmission 
network, transmission operator (Red Eléctrica de España ), qualified customers (contracted power ≥ 15 
MW) connected to the transmission network, and distribution network managers. The requirements for 
the voltage control service providers at transmission level are divided into mandatory and optional. The 
optional requirements can be required by the system operator when necessary in real time. In Italy the 
voltage constraints are currently taken into account in the resolution on ancillary service market.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
Voltage control is one of the key aspects in managing power system stability, and it is becoming more 
challenging at the distribution level with the increase levels of DERs In the SmartNet project voltage 
management is considered one of the key aspects, with the DERs participating in provision of this 
service[50] both to DSO and to support the voltage at transmission network. Within SmartNet 
coordination schemes, this service is delivered in several coordination schemes: The Local AS market, 
Shared Balancing Responsibility, and Common TSO-DSO AS market.  
In the Local AS market, DSO offers the amount of reactive power that does not increase the ranges of 
acceptable losses. TSO chooses which voltage control offers to use, both from the resources connecting at 
transmission network or from the DSOs, and then notifies the selected offer. In the Shared Balancing 
Responsibility, a pre-defined schedule profile is shared between TSO and DSO at the border of 
transmission and distribution network. This pre-defined schedule profile includes definition on voltage 
set-point, which can be either agreed between TSO and DSO or is determined by TSO only. In the Common 
TSO-DSO AS market, TSO and DSO share the same objective (i.e. minimize activation costs), so that DSO 
may provide certain amount of reactive power, even if it increases the ranges of acceptable losses. 
 Availability of reserve capacity 3.1.8
Both the electricity Directive [5] and the recast of electricity Regulation [6] suggests a focus on 
strengthening short-term markets by adapting market rules, in order to cope with increasing penetration 
of Renewable Energy Sources (RES). The electricity Regulation [6] specifically defines that procurement 
of balancing energy and capacity should be done separately. In addition, procurement of upward and 
downward balancing capacity should be done separately as well.  
The EDSO position paper [10] proposes that contractual agreements with flexible parties may be based 
on capacity procurement, rather than energy. 
The Guideline on Electricity Balancing [15] is reviewed in [24]. It is mentioned in [24] that the Guideline 
[15] considers the exchange of balancing capacity as potential ways to achieve a more efficient reserve 
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procurement. It foresees the possibility to exchange balancing capacity between TSOs and TSO-BSP, as 
the way of balancing capacity exchanges are similar. Moreover, TSOs can also share reserves, e.g. 
Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) and Replacement Reserves (RR), to meet their requirements for 
reserve. To achieve the exchange of balancing capacity and sharing of reserve, it requires inter TSO 
cooperation on close to real time and forward capacity calculations and updates to determine the 
capacity that will be used for exchanging or sharing [24]. In addition, as required in the Guideline [15], 
TSOs need to continuously update the cross-zonal capacity availability. 
The Guideline on Electricity Balancing [15] defines the procurement and exchange rules for balancing 
capacity. Each TSO is asked to conduct optimal reserve capacity provision analysis at minimum costs, 
considering balancing capacity procurement at the control network, exchange of balancing capacity with 
neighbouring TSOs, sharing of reserves, and non-contracted balancing energy bids if they are available at 
the control area or within the European platforms. The balancing capacity should be procured through 1) 
market-based method for at least the FRR and the RR; 2) a short term and economically efficient process; 
3) several contracting periods maybe involved with the contracted volume. In addition, the Guideline [15] 
also expects separate procurement of upward and downward balancing capacity for at least the FRR and 
the RR. If TSOs exchange balancing capacity, a proposal is needed for the common rules. 
In Spanish electricity system, the automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR) is an optional service 
which is limited to be provided by the regulation zones [27]. For the RR, it is mandatory for the 
programming units to submit bids for the service. The units have been pre-qualified by the system 
operator (Red Eléctrica de España) for the service provision. The bids need to include all the available 
power reserve, including upward and downward availability, and the corresponding energy prices [28]. 
Energinet as the Danish TSO has agreements with some energy suppliers to ensure the availability of 
reserve power. The suppliers must enter into a main agreement with Energinet relating to the supply of 
ancillary services [37]. To ensure sufficient reserve capacity is available on the regulating power market, 
Energinet has concluded reserve capacity markets [38]. In the regulating power market, market players 
are paid at a fixed availability payment for being available and submitting bids for upward/downward 
regulation.  The Italian market is based on procurement of energy and not capacity. In order to be 
compliant with the Network Codes, there are possibilities to price also the capacity.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet’s schemes 
The SmartNet project considers four ancillary services (AS), which are: balancing and congestion 
management, frequency control, and voltage control. For balancing and congestion management, aFRR 
(automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve), mFRR (manual Frequency Restoration Reserve) and RR 
(Replacement Reserve) are considered3. FCR (Frequency Containment Reserve)/primary reserve is not 
                                                                   
3 Depending upon national classification mFRR and RR can belong to the same regulation - tertiary 
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considered in SmartNet. On the experience of SmartNet the fact that intraday sessions can fuse with RT 
markets. This may require a particular attention because TSO and DSO need a clear demand to satisfy and 
can’t cope with a continuous readjustment of the positions by the Commercial Market Parties. 
 Relationship with previous markets  3.1.9
In the recent European legislative documents [6] the market participants shall be allowed to bid into 
balancing markets as close to real time operation as possible, and at least after the intraday cross-zonal 
gate closure time - at most 1 hour before the delivery [9]. 
Stakeholders’ positions do not address directly relationship with previous markets, except for the ENTSO-
E’s working paper [22], specifying that “balancing market design should be compatible with wholesale 
markets”. 
When it comes to the existing practice, e.g. in Denmark, the intra-day market closes 1 hour before the 
delivery, while the regulating power (balancing) market closes 45 minutes before the delivery [41]. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet’s schemes 
There are limited requirements or expressed stakeholders’ positions regarding the relationship between 
Intra Day and the real-time market it in the present legislative documents such as directives, network 
codes or other position papers. The only guideline is that the participants in the balancing markets shall 
be allowed to bid as close to real-time as possible and at least after the intraday gate closure.  
 Pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-clear 3.1.10
The recast Regulation on internal electricity market [6] requires that marginal pricing (pay-as-clear) 
should be used for the settlement of balancing energy. The Guideline on electricity balancing [15] has 
mentioned that the pricing for balancing energy (energy from activated balancing energy bids) used for 
the frequency restoration process and the reserve replacement process should be based on marginal 
pricing (pay-as-clear).   
The USEF’s work on the integration of Demand Responses (DR) [36] looks into different aggregator 
models, which could be used to implement the role of aggregator in energy markets. In the framework 
implementation report [36], USEF recommends a market approach based on a pay-as-bid pricing model 
for the clearing price when a DSO performs active grid capacity management to solve potential 
congestion using flexibility services from aggregators. The claim is that pay-as-bid model will lead to 
lowest costs for the DSO and for society. This is because in a pay-as-bid pricing model, the flexibility 
providers receive the price bidden if their flexibilities are provided to the DSO, rather than being paid at 
the most expensive accepted offer (in a pay-as-clear model).  
When it comes to the present practice “pay-as-clear” is a preferred pricing for the European electricity 
wholesale markets [26], [28]. According to [27], in Spain two reserve services are paid at the marginal 
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price, including 1) the regulation power band; and 2) the effective net energy of the Replacement Reserve 
(RR) that is necessary to be assigned for the replacement of the Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR). In 
the Danish electricity market, the primary reserve is cleared at marginal pricing (pay-as-clear), while the 
others are cleared at their individual bids (pay-as-bid) [37]. It is also confirmed in [41] that pay-as-clear 
is mainly used in Danish balancing market, except in certain cases. Bids involving limitations (e.g. in time, 
in volume, and in activation mode), can be activated under special circumstances and are settled at the 
bid prices (pay-as-bid). The Italian ancillary service markets use pay-as-bid pricing.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
EU legislation and guidelines [6], [7] and [15] require using pay-as-clear for balancing energy. 
 Optimisation criterion for electricity market design - maximization of 3.1.11
social welfare vs. minimum activation costs 
In the recent legislative documents of the European Union [5] and [6] it is explicitly stated that maximum 
benefits for the society is the key objective for the current electricity market design. The set of documents 
“Clean Energy for all Europeans” [9], which combines the assessment for the recast of the Directive and 
regulation of the IEM,  specifies that the main aim is to reduce barriers (e.g. by promoting a balancing 
market design that takes into account technical capabilities or units, or by championing a minimum 
product size of 1 MW for DA and ID trading [9]) and market failures in order to increase social welfare via 
improved market design. CEER in document on DSO-TSO cooperation issues [24] refers to maximising the 
whole system’s efficiency.  
The importance of social welfare as the main objective seems to be supported by several stakeholders. 
ETIP-SNET in [3] mentions the social welfare in several places across the document, stating that new 
solutions should maximise the social welfare, CBA tools should investigate it and the overarching goal for 
the whole R&I Roadmap is to optimise the European welfare. This position is further supported by 
ENTSO-E in several documents, as for example [4], where optimising of the social welfare in the long term 
is one of the goals of ENTSO-E’s strategy scope.  
By Moving the focus from high level and rather generic, to more specific, documents, in [13] EDSO argues 
that both TSO and DSO should contribute to maximisation of social welfare with a fair cost and benefit 
allocation. When a DSO expands, its network proper assessments have to be made in order to maximise 
the social welfare. Furthermore in [22] ENTSO-E suggests that the use of distributed flexibility reserves 
(DFR) should be prioritized in those places, where they provide the highest value for the system. 
WindEurope in [14] points out that the provision of the reserve capacity should be optimal i.e. based on 
coherent (considering distribution operational constraints) and coordinated (so that critical data 
exchanges take place) dispatching orders (NB! not minimal) with minimisation of the costs. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
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Based on the screened documents, one can conclude that maximisation of the social welfare is the 
dominating optimisation criterion. SmartNet used objective function of minimisation of activation costs 
expressed as maximisation of the social welfare.  
 Roles and Responsibilities in the context of the prequalification, 3.1.12
procurement, activation and settlement of AS markets including 
observability 
The present position (i.e. status quo) - reference to the existing regulatory documents 
The TSOs and DSOs roles and responsibilities, and their shared responsibilities defined in the regulations 
and Network Guidelines [5], [6], [15], [27] and [28] are listed below. 
TSOs’ roles and responsibilities: 
• Maintain the balancing of and development of its transmission network, by closely cooperating 
with neighbouring TSOs and connecting DSOs, in an economic, environmental, and efficient 
manner. Ensure operational security by procuring ancillary services from market participants, 
including renewable energy sources, aggregators, demand responses, and energy storage 
devices.  Define technical requirements for market participants. Furthermore, procure balancing 
services and non-frequency ancillary services (e.g. steady state voltage control), in a transparent, 
non-discriminatory, and market-based procedure [5]. 
• In the balancing market, publish close to real time network balancing information, the imbalance 
price, and the balancing energy price [6] 
• In capacity allocation and congestion management, if technically possible, use the line to its 
maximum (i.e. overrated) capacity to relief the congestion [6] 
• May calculate and settle activated volume of balancing energy for frequency containment 
process, frequency restoration process, frequency replacement process with BSP. Calculate 
imbalance adjustment, which will be applied to the associated BSPs for each activated balancing 
energy bid and determine the activated volume of balancing energy. Apply the imbalance 
settlement period of 15 minutes, after three years entry into the Guideline on Electricity 
Balancing [15] 
• Calculate cross-zonal capacity at least after day-ahead and after intra-day cross-zonal gate 
closure time [6]. Continuously update the cross-zonal capacity availability, after the intra-day 
cross-zonal gate closure time [15]. Moreover, allocate available cross-zonal capacity in the next 
cross-zonal capacity allocation process [6] 
• If there is cross-border participation in capacity mechanism, specify required technical functions 
in capacity mechanism and register capacity providers in the registry as eligible providers, also 
carry out availability checks [6] 
• Provide all necessary information to the operator of an interconnected system [5] 
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• For LFC (Load-Frequency Control) block, TSOs need to assess and review the reserve capacity 
requirements regularly [15] 
• Collect charges relevant to the transmission system, including access charges and ancillary 
services charges [5], and clearly state beforehand how the congestion income will be used and 
report the actual income use [6]. 
DSOs’ roles and responsibilities: 
• Maintain the balance of its distribution network and develop its network, in an economic, 
environmental, and efficient manner [5] 
• Comply with unbundling conditions [5] 
• Data management of smart meters [5] 
• Provide information to the connecting TSO in due time, for the purpose of performing imbalance 
settlement [15] 
TSOs & DSOs joint responsibilities: 
• Ensure effective and efficient balancing with BSPs [15] 
• Develop a cost method for allocating costs resulting from actions of DSOs, e.g. for prequalification 
of reserves [15] 
In the Spanish electricity grid pre-qualification is carried out by the system operator, Red Eléctrica de 
España [27] ,[28] . 
Evolving of the responsibilities - reference to the existing regulatory documents 
The potential responsibilities, proposed in [5], [6] and [21] mainly aim to better integrate Distributed 
Flexibility Resources (DFRs) and to increase the engagement from aggregators. TSO’s future 
responsibilities do not change significantly, whereas DSOs will see a transition of their roles from merely 
passive to more active.  DSOs might be allowed to procure and manage services at distribution network 
for network operation and development, including the flexibility resources. The potential changes in 
responsibilities are as follows: 
 TSOs’ potential responsibilities: 
• Ensure efficient participation of all market participants including renewable energy sources, demand 
response, energy storage facilities and aggregators, in particular by requiring regulatory authorities 
or transmission system operators in close cooperation with all market participants, to define 
technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis of technical requirements of these 
markets and the capability of all market participants.  
• May own, develop, manage or operate storage devices, if it has been granted by the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA), or if no interest from commercial entities, or if they are necessary to 
fulfil obligations. [5] 
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DSOs’ potential responsibilities: 
• DSOs could be allowed to manage connected flexibility resources at their respective networks, and 
use flexibility to improve operational efficiency, including local congestion management [5] 
• Define standardised market products for the services procured, exchange necessary information and 
coordinate with TSOs. Procure energy for covering losses and non-frequency ancillary services in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory, and market-based procedure. Technical specifications for the 
service providers need to be defined between the DSO (/regulatory authorities) and all market 
participants. In addition, DSOs shall remunerate for the service procured adequately [5] 
• Define or remotely control the droops or the set points for the DER active and reactive powers 
(mainly based on the requirements given by the TSO) [21] 
• Play an active role in integration of electro-mobility and energy storage devices– own, develop, 
manage or operate recharging points or storage devices, if it has been granted by the NRA, or if no 
interest from commercial entities, or if it complies with unbundling conditions [5] 
TSOs & DSOs joint responsibilities: 
• Cooperate with demand service providers and customers, to define technical specifications of 
demand side participation. This also includes potential engagement from aggregators [5] 
• Use proper methods to guarantee the minimum curtailment or downward re-dispatching of 
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and high efficiency co-generation [6] 
The stakeholders’ opinions 
The stakeholders agree with the regulatory documents about the overall division of responsibilities for 
the SOs: TSOs and DSOs are responsible for maintaining system stability of their respective network. 
TSOs are responsible for system balancing, and DSOs are responsible for managing voltage and 
congestion at distribution networks (ETIP-SNET [3], common ENTSO-E, CEDEC, EDSO for SG, Eurelectric 
and GEODE [13], [16], WindEurope [14],  ENTSO-E [18], [22], European University Institute (EUI) [24], 
CEER [25] and ENA [36]). However, several of the stakeholder documents are more specific about details 
than the regulatory documents: 
TSOs’ roles and responsibilities: 
• Could access data related to users in the distribution network, through the respective 
aggregator/ Balancing Service Provider (BSP), or through the connecting DSOs, or directly 
through the grid users for specific needs. In addition, 2 out of these 3 options may create 
unnecessary redundancy [18] 
• Be aware of when a DFR capacity for balancing is affected, and consider this when procuring 
balancing capacities, including pre-qualification and dimensioning process [22] 
• If there is a contractual relationship with the aggregator/BSP, TSOs need to pay the 
aggregator/BSP for the delivered flexibility and to correct the perimeter if necessary [36] 
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DSOs’ roles and responsibilities: 
• Manage voltage and congestion of their respective networks [3], [14] and [16]  with flexible 
resources under commercial arrangements of connections (i.e. firm and non-firm) [24], as well as 
imposing restrictions to flexibility bids offered to TSO or commercial players [36] and ensure 
coherence between system need (i.e. ancillary services) and grid constraints [14] 
• Play the role of market facilitator and operate their grids to allow all the resources to provide 
services in (wholesale and ancillary service) markets [10] 
• Monitor the current border of distribution and transmission network via a pre-qualification 
process, for balancing services connected to the distribution network and offered to the TSO [24] 
• Be allowed to access all necessary data to fulfil their grid obligations, and to access a common 
European data format or a limited ‘minimum content’s data format [10] 
• The USEF work proposes that, for the settlement between DSO and aggregator, DSO is 
responsible for settling the flexibility acquired from aggregators, including checking whether the 
acquired flexibility has been delivered based on the agreements [43] 
TSOs & DSOs joint responsibilities: 
• Allow an efficient system operation [25], neutrally manage their networks, including the secure 
network operation, congestion management and voltage control [13]. Both are responsible for 
product definition, procurement, and activation (including setting limitations for product 
activations) [18], [22]. In addition, optimally allocate the outputs of flexible resources [22]. 
• Recognise one complete energy system instead of several separate systems, e.g. TSO networks, 
DSO networks, etc. [13] 
• Ensure coherence between DERs connected at distribution network (by TSOs) and distribution 
network constraints (DSOs) [14] 
• Data transfer between DSOs and TSOs should in accordance with the principles of “data 
parsimony and EU data protection regulation” and align with the cascading principle [10] 
SmartNet Coordination schemes relevant for provision of ancillary services  
In SmartNet Coordination Schemes (CSs), the major differences between CSs lie in the market 
arrangement for the procurement of ancillary/system services. The grid operation, pre-qualification, 
activation, and settlement processes of flexible resources are similar across the CSs. Table 5 summarises 
grid operation roles, including SO, system balancing responsible party, and data manager, for each CS. 
Among the CSs, both TSO and DSO are responsible for managing system balance in shared balancing 
responsibility model, whereas only TSO manages network balance in the other four CSs. As defined in [5], 
TSO and DSO are responsible for maintaining the balance of their respective network.  
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For the pre-qualification responsibility, as it was described earlier in Section 0,  DSO is responsible for the 
system pre-qualification process in the SmartNet CSs, and a certified independent actor could be 
responsible for the technical pre-qualification process. 
Table 5 Grid operation roles adoption across coordination schemes 
   Coordination Schemes 
  Role Centralised 
AS Market 
Model 
Local AS 
Market 
Model 
Shared 
balancing 
responsibilit
y model 
Common 
TSO-DSO 
AS market 
model 
Integrate
d 
flexibility 
market 
model 
D
o
m
a
in
 
G
ri
d
 O
p
e
r
a
ti
o
n
 
System 
Operator (SO) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
System Balance 
Responsible 
(GBR) 
TSO (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx; 
Dx) 
Data Manager 
(DM) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
IMO 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
 
The recast regulation on the electricity internal market [5] requires TSOs to procure balancing services 
and non-frequency ancillary services (e.g. steady state voltage control etc.), in a transparent, non-
discriminatory, and market-based procedure. One of the reasons that SmartNet proposes CSs is to achieve 
an enhanced operation between TSOs and DSOs. The proposed procurement responsibilities in the 
SmartNet CSs are listed below and summarised in Table 6. 
• In centralised AS market model, TSO is the only buyer of resources, CMPs (commercial market 
parties) are the only sellers. The centralised market is operated by TSO for the resources 
connecting at both transmission and distribution network. Aggregation of flexibility resources is 
carried out by flexibility service providers or aggregators (CMPs) in centralised AS market model.  
• In local AS market model, shared balancing responsibility model, and common TSO-DSO AS 
market model, TSO and DSO can buy flexibility resources, CMPs are the sellers. DSO has priority 
to allocate flexibility connecting at distribution network in local AS market model, and TSO and 
DSO manage their respective networks. In local AS market model, in addition to the possibility 
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that CMPs aggregate flexibility resources, it is also possible that DSO aggregates the resources 
connecting at distribution network and offers them to TSO.  
• In shared balancing responsibility model, TSO and DSO manage their respective networks, and 
CMPs aggregate the flexibility resources.  
• In common TSO-DSO AS market model, TSO and DSO operate the network together, by 
optimising the market in mutual agreement. CMPs and DSO can aggregate flexibility resources in 
common TSO-DSO AS market model.  
• Since integrated flexibility market model has a common market operated by IMO (independent 
market operator), both transmission and distribution networks are operated by IMO. 
Considering CMPs are also allowed to compete equally with TSO and DSO in integrated flexibility 
market model, CMPs can buy flexibility resources, and SOs can sell contracted flexibility back to 
the market. 
Table 6 Procurement roles adoption across coordination schemes 
   Coordination Schemes 
  Role Centralised AS 
Market Model 
Local AS 
Market Model 
Shared 
balancing 
responsibility 
model 
Common TSO-
DSO AS 
market model 
Integrated 
flexibility 
market model 
D
o
m
a
in
 
P
ro
cu
re
m
e
n
t 
Reserve 
Allocator 
(RA) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
Buyer TSO (Tx; Dx) TSO (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; Dx) 
Seller CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
Market 
Operator 
(MO) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) TSO (Tx) 
 DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
 DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Tx; Dx) 
IMO (Tx; Dx) 
Aggrega-tor CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; Dx) CMP (Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; Dx) 
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The most optimum resources are selected after the market clearing for activation and settlement. Table 7 
and Table 8 give an overview of the activation and settlement roles in SmartNet CSs.  
 
Table 7 Activation roles adoption across coordination schemes 
   Coordination Schemes 
  Role Centralised 
AS Market 
Model 
Local AS 
Market 
Model 
Shared 
balancing 
responsibility 
model 
Common 
TSO-DSO 
AS market 
model 
Integrated 
flexibility 
market model 
D
o
m
a
in
 
A
c
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
 
Flexibility 
Dispat-
cher (FD) 
TSO, CMP 
(Tx; Dx) 
DSO (Dx) 
TSO (Tx; Dx) 
CMP (Tx; Dx) 
TSO (Tx) DSO 
(Dx) CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
IMO and TSO 
(Tx; Dx) DSO 
(Dx) CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
 
CMPs are involved in the activation process, as they send activation signals to individual DERs connecting 
at transmission and distribution network. In centralised market, since only TSO manages the network, 
TSO activates the selected resources. IMO operates the common market in integrated flexibility market 
model, therefore, IMO is involved in resource activation. The settlement process to verify the activation 
could be done by SOs. After regulation approval, independent CMP can also measure the activation of 
flexibility resources. 
Table 8 Settlement roles adoption and across coordination schemes 
   Coordination Schemes 
  Role Centralised 
AS Market 
Model 
Local AS 
Market 
Model 
Shared 
balancing 
responsibility 
model 
Common 
TSO-DSO 
AS market 
model 
Integrated 
flexibility 
market model 
D
o
m
a
in
 
S
e
tt
le
m
e
n
t 
Metered 
Data 
Respon-
sible 
(MDR) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx) DSO 
(Dx) CMP 
(Tx; Dx) 
TSO (Tx) DSO 
(Dx) CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx) 
DSO (Dx) 
CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
TSO (Tx) DSO 
(Dx) CMP (Tx; 
Dx) 
 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
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SmartNet has proposed five Coordination Schemes among other to achieve an enhanced operation 
between TSOs and DSOs.  The choice of any particular coordination scheme at any moment in time still 
allows the possibility to evolve to another coordination scheme in the future. A change from one 
coordination scheme to another is in principle a question of a change in roles, responsibilities and market 
design [56]. 
 The major differences between the CSs lie in the market arrangement for the procurement of 
ancillary/system services. The grid operation, pre-qualification, activation, and settlement processes of 
flexible resources are similar across the CSs. As defined in the recast regulation on the electricity internal 
market [5], in the five CS, TSO and DSO are responsible for maintaining the balance of their respective 
networks. [5] also requires TSOs to procure balancing services and non-frequency ancillary services, in a 
transparent, non-discriminatory, and market-based procedure. However, the regulation does not specify 
further how the balancing market shall be organized. There are several ways to organise the market 
within the regulation. 
In the CS "Centralized AS market model", the TSO is the buyer of balancing services. But in the other CSs 
the DSO can also buy balancing services. In one of the schemes, "Integrated flexibility market", a 
Commercial Market Provider can buy balancing services.  
EDSO proposes the DSOs as market facilitators. The SmartNet CSs propose different solutions: in the 
Centralized AS market model, the TSO operates the market. In the Local AS market, the Shared balancing 
responsibility scheme and in the Common TSO-DSO AS market scheme, both the TSOs and DSOs operates 
the balancing market. In the last CS, the Integrated flexibility market model, an Independent Market 
Operator operates the market. In the "Shared balancing responsibility model", balancing responsibilities 
are divided between TSO and DSO according to a predefined schedule. The DSO organizes a local market 
to respect the schedule agreed with the TSO while the TSO has no access to resources connected at the 
distribution grid. Such an organisation of the market means new tasks and responsibilities for the DSO 
and is not fully in accordance with the present regulation. Furthermore, liquidity may be a challenge in a 
market limited by a DSO region. As shown in Table 9 "The Shared balancing responsibility model" is the 
only scheme where the DSO is responsible for buying local flexibility for balancing. 
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Table 9 The role of the DSO in the Coordination Schemes. Source: [52][56].  
Coordination scheme Role of the DSO 
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Centralized AS market model 
• Limited to possible process of 
prequalification 
Local AS market model 
• Organization of local market 
• Buyer of flexibility for local 
congestion management 
• Aggregation of resources to central 
market 
Shared Balancing Responsibility 
model 
• Organization of local market 
• Buyer of flexibility for local 
congestion management and 
balancing 
Common TSO-DSO AS market 
model 
• Organization of flexibility market in 
cooperation with TSO 
• Buyer of flexibility for local 
congestion management 
Integrated Flexibility market 
model 
• Buyer of flexibility for local 
congestion management 
 
Present regulation also states that TSOs & DSOs have joint responsibilities for cooperation with demand 
service providers and customers, to define technical specifications of demand side participation. This also 
includes potential engagement from aggregators [5]. The cooperation can be done in many ways, and the 
regulation does not specify how. 
When it comes to present markets/systems, in Spain, pre-qualification is carried out by the TSO (Red 
Eléctrica de España) [27], [28], while SmartNet recommends the DSO. 
 Ancillary services considered in the screened documents 3.1.13
In the Directive on common rules for the IEM, the Commission classifies ancillary services (AS) into 
balancing (frequency related) and non-frequency AS, but not congestion management. The term non-
frequency ancillary services is applied for steady-state voltage control, fast reactive current injections, 
inertia and black start capability [5]. In [6] ancillary services are mentioned without specification, e.g. 
frequency containment reserves, frequency restoration reserves and replacement reserves. The 
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document refers to the Network codes [15] (Guideline on electricity balancing) and mentions Frequency 
restoration reserves, frequency containment reserves and replacement reserves.  
The ENTSO-E's Research and Development Road Map 2017-2026 [4] mentions faster ramping services, 
frequency response, inertia response, active and reactive power reserves, flexibility reserves (short-term 
and long term), voltage control and network restoration. The TSO-DSO data management report [13] 
mentions Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR), Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) and 
Replacement Reserves (RR).  Furthermore, it also mentions fast reserve control, Load-Frequency Control 
(LFC) and automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR). The reference [23] written by Nordic TSOs, 
mentions the following ancillary services: frequency restoration reserves (FRR), replacement reserves 
(RR) and frequency containment reserves (FCR). 
When it comes to the present position, there is one Spanish document about Automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserves (aFRR) [26], one about Replacement Reserves (RR) [27] and one about Voltage 
control [31]. Voltage control is not an ancillary service based on ENTSO-E definition. Ancillary services 
mentioned in [37] for Denmark (for DK1 and DK2 zones) are:  
• Primary reserves DK1 (FCR) 
• aFRR supply ability, DK1+DK2 
• Secondary reserve DK1 (aFRR) 
• Frequency-controlled normal operation reserve, DK2 (FCR-N) 
• Frequency-controlled disturbance reserve, DK2 (FCR-D)  
• Manual reserve, DK1+DK2 (mFRR)  
3.2 Bidding Layer 
 Possibility to create “virtual” copperplate bids vs nodal bidding 3.2.1
The Recast IEM Regulation proposal [6] highlights correct locational price signals, which reflect where 
electricity demand is high, are needed for efficient investments in a zonal electricity system. The process 
of determining correct locational price signals needs to be transparent. It also requires a reliable and 
coherent establishment of bidding zones could indicate structural congestions [6]. Structural congestion 
refers to the predictable congestions in transmission networks, which always occur at the same locations 
and reoccur frequently under normal network conditions. 
In the Spanish electricity system, virtual copperplate bids do not exist [26], [27] and [28]. The 
programming units, which are defined as the elementary representation units in the Spanish energy 
markets, allow the integration of individual installations in the Spanish market. One of the functions to be 
performed by the responsible programming unit is the disaggregation of the assigned schedules into 
physical generation units. Therefore, the system operator knows the physical units that have been 
assigned to each operating schedule. In addition, for the provision of this Replacement Reserve (RR) [28], 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 54  
 
all programming units qualified by the system operator must submit a bid for the whole available RR 
power, including upward and downward availability, for each programming periods of the following day. 
The Italian power market is a central dispatch power system. Based on this, the bidding is typically nodal. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
In SmartNet, four different aggregation methods are used, one of which is called justified 
approximation/hybrid approach [49], [62]. The hybrid approach uses a single or limited number of 
virtual devices to present the aggregated devices. Thus, the number of individual devices is reduced. The 
approach is used when there is a high number of devices to be aggregated. 
 Possible bidding negative prices in AS Markets (otherwise RES non-3.2.2
incentivized) 
 The EU directives or other documents from the Commission., as well as documents from stakeholders do 
not discus prices for bidding in AS Markets, nor possibilities of the negative price bids. 
The exception is Spain  [26], [27], where the producer sells energy to the day-ahead market and rebuys it 
in the balancing markets (downward regulation). In general, the producer pays to the balancing market a 
price that is lower (but not negative) than the day-ahead market price. Similar definitions of down-
regulation are used in Nordic electricity market. Essentially, the producer is motivated to down-regulate 
as soon as the TSO's offer for the down-regulation is less than the producer's generating cost/loss of 
subsidies. Furthermore, Italian AS market also does not allow for negative bidding.   
 Dimension of bidding zones 3.2.3
Bidding zone is the largest geographical area within which market participants are able to exchange 
energy without capacity allocation. This definition is commonly used and originates from the previous 
version (2012) of CACM Network Codes (the recent version of the document [7] does not seem to have 
this definition included).  In the scope of the present project, dimension of the bidding zones is important 
since it should allow the traders to be flexible and support security of operation of the system.  
The recast of the Regulation for IEM [6] advocates that the bidding zone borders for capacity allocation 
should be defined on the basis of long-term congestions in the transmission network, and the zones 
should not contain structural congestions. Structural congestions refer to the predictable congestions in 
transmission networks, which always occur at the same locations and reoccur frequently under normal 
network conditions.  In addition, the dimension of each bidding zone should be equal to an imbalance 
price area. Moreover, the configuration of the bidding zones should also be designed to maximise 
economic efficiency and cross-border trading opportunities and maintain the security of supply at the 
same time. The design of bidding zones could help with determining correct locational signals in a zonal 
electricity system. 
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The Capacity Allocation & Congestion Management (CACM) Network Guideline [7] highlights that bidding 
zones must reflect the distribution of supply and demand in order to achieve the full potential of capacity 
allocation methods. Thus, bidding zones should be defined to ensure efficient congestion management 
and to guarantee overall market efficiency. The zones can be modified through splitting, merging, or 
adjusting the zone borders. In addition, the bidding zones should be identical for all market time-frames. 
In Spanish electricity system, bids are submitted by the responsible regulation zones, in which 
programming units are included. The programming units are formed by one or more generation 
installations that are qualified for service provision. The minimum size of the regulation zones is fixed in 
300 MW of installed power. This value could be lower, but must be higher than 200 MW, if the available 
capacity for regulation is equal to or higher than 75% of the zone size [27]. For the purpose of active 
participation in the service provision, each generation installation needs to be qualified by the system 
operator (Red Eléctrica de España) and pass the corresponding tests. Each programming unit must 
provide a minimum bid capacity of 10 MW [27], [28]. This can be several aggregated installations that 
belong to the same type of technology, the same programming unit, and the same control centre [28]. In 
the Nordic countries (ex-NORDEL) the bidding zones are defined by TSOs as a part of managing:  
• Major and long-term operational congestions occurring in the regional and central grid system. 
• Foreseen energy deficit situations in defined geographical areas. 
• In 2018 it was five bidding zones in Norway, four in Sweden, one in Finland and two in Denmark 
(DK1 area is not synchronous to ex-NORDEL).  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
The CACM [7] requires that bidding zones reflect on the distribution of supply and demand, in order to 
allow the full potential of capacity allocation methods. Therefore, the bidding zones need to be designed 
to ensure efficient congestion management and to guarantee overall market efficiency. The zones can be 
modified by adjusting the zone borders, e.g. merging or splitting. It should also be identical for all market 
timeframes. 
The recast Electricity Regulation [6] highlights that the bidding zone borders should be defined based on 
long-term transmission network congestions but should not contain structural congestions. Each bidding 
zone dimension should be equal to an imbalance price area, and the zones should be defined to maximise 
economic efficiency and cross-border trading opportunities, as well as to maintain the security of supply. 
In addition, this configuration of bidding zones could help with the determination of correct locational 
signals in a zonal electricity system.  
In the introductory part in Section 0 it was already mentioned that this issue has very limited relevance 
for the SmarNet. The SmartNet’s market clearing makes nodal prices taking into account the grid 
constraints. That always ensures efficient congestion management. 
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 Definition of bidding products (complex, integral/mutual exclusion…) 3.2.4
The recent legislative acts, which have been studied in the scope of the present activity do include 
specifically quantified requirements related to configuration of bids on the balancing markets. In [15] it 
is, however, mentioned that standard bidding products for balancing energy and balancing capacity 
should at least include the following characteristics: 
• preparation period; 
• ramping period; 
• full activation time; 
• minimum and maximum quantity; 
• deactivation period; 
• minimum and maximum duration of delivery period; 
• validity period; 
• mode of activation.  
These are not necessarily required, but rather allow for possibilities to develop more complex bids. The 
same document sets framework for introducing of specific products by each TSO, provided that standard 
products are insufficient and that the use of these is to be minimised subject to economic efficiency. 
When it comes to other requirements, related to configuration of bids, in [6] it is mentioned that 
balancing energy should be procured separately from balancing capacity and the procurement of upward 
and downward balancing capacity should be done separately i.e. as separate bids. With relation to DAM 
and IDM it is mentioned that the minimum bid size should be 1 MW, but this does not necessarily bring 
any immediate implications to configuration of bids on the balancing market.  
There is no explicit mentioning of design for the bids on the stakeholder side either. ENTSO-E in [22] 
hints that the bidding process should fulfil needs for both distribution and transmission networks and 
that network operators could select bids based on their compliance with restrictions/network limitations 
so that security criteria is ensured. WindEurope in [14] points out that configuration of bids should allow 
products to be adapted to different technologies entering the mix e.g. products with short duration, lead 
delivery tie and higher granularity. The latter is a measure that reduces market discrimination or said 
differently improves market participation and hence, liquidity. This, in fact complies with the above-
mentioned requirement from the Commission.  
The present practice at balancing market in Spain [26], [27] is prevailing simple bids, however the 
thermal groups can submit complex bids although. this contradicts the present intention for non-
discrimination of specific technologies. Requirements for regulating power market in Nordic countries 
define simple bids with minimum duration of one hour and minimum bid size of 10 MW.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
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Introduction of complex bids in SmartNet was intended to support involvement of different DER 
technologies into provision of ancillary services and thus increase the overall liquidity of the market. 
Regarding bids defined and proposed in SmartNet, the above-mentioned requirements, especially in [15] 
do not necessarily support introduction of complex bids. At the very same time it allows introducing new 
type of bids by TSOs.  It can be however a challenge to elevate bids, proposed by SmartNet to a level of so-
called “standard products”, as it is required by ENTSO-E. 
 Incentivisation mechanisms for RES vs price revelation in AS Market 3.2.5
The Clean Energy for All Europeans [8] emphasizes that the regulatory framework should ensure 
participation of RES in market in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. It also mentions the need to 
develop shorter term trading in the wholesale market, as the close to real time trading will reward 
flexibility for generation (including RES (Renewable Energy Resource)), demand, or storage. 
Furthermore, priority dispatch will still apply to existing small-scale renewable generation, and the 
curtailment of renewable power should be kept to a minimum level. To cover high capital costs of 
renewables and to minimise market distortion, the renewables directive contains principles that support 
renewables after 2020 by ensuring subsidies. 
The recast of Electricity Regulation [6] therefore promotes: 
• reducing market barriers for RES participation (by lowering the bid size) 
It is proposed in [6] that small bid sizes with a minimum size of 1MW or less should be allowed to trade in 
day-ahead and intraday markets, with the objective to achieve effective participation of Demand Side 
Responses (DSR), small-scale renewables and energy storage. These measures are expected to decrease 
the system operation costs and increase the level of integration for renewable generation.  
• priority of dispatch for RES and high-efficiency technologies below a threshold (capacity) 
It is also highlighted in [6] that TSOs should give priority to Renewable Energy Resource (RES) or high-
efficiency cogeneration with a generation capacity lower than 500 kW, when dispatching electricity 
generation installations. If the installed generation capacity for priority dispatching is higher than 15% of 
the total installed capacity, RES or high-efficiency cogeneration less than 250 kW will be dispatched first. 
From 2026, the priority will apply for RES or high-efficiency cogeneration less than 250 kW, and it will be 
125 kW if the penetration is larger than 15%. In any case, priority dispatch should not impact the security 
of supply (i.e. no supply interruptions).  
• optimal redispatching and curtailment of RES and high efficiency technologies 
When it comes to redispatching and curtailment, the Recast Electricity Regulation [6] advocates TSOs and 
DSOs to take appropriate measures and guarantee optimal curtailment and downward redispatching of 
RES and high-efficiency cogeneration. For instance, it is recommended in [6] that redispatching and 
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curtailment of RES and high efficiency cogenerations should not exceed 5% of the installed (RES and high 
efficiency cogenerations) capacity. 
The 2030 Energy Strategy [1] mentions that although subsidies for energy technologies, including RES, 
distorts markets, they are still needed for 1) mature technologies, subsidies will be phased out by 2030; 
and 2) for new and developing technologies which could contribute to RES penetration. 
WindEurope [14] proposes that wind power producers should have non-discriminatory access to 
balancing and ancillary services markets, and system operators should procure technology-neutral 
services regardless of the technology used. WindEurope [14] also advocates the need of new connection 
approaches to allow flexible connections and to achieve economic efficient network operation. Moreover, 
it lists options to reduce the risk of curtailment of DGs and flexible connections (including renewables 
and energy storage). The options are 1) introduction of market mechanisms to reduce curtailment cost, 
2) introduction of caps to limit the risk of curtailment, 3) compensation for the lost revenue due to 
curtailment, and 4) more transparent data regarding curtailment and redispatching activities. 
ENTSO-E in a working paper [22] promotes that suitable products should be defined by TSOs and DSOs 
jointly, considering both system operators’ needs and flexibility providers’ interests. ENTSO-E also 
advocates [22] that the solutions for using distributed flexibilities (including renewables) should be 
consistent with EU market design principles and be guided by economic efficiency principles at an early 
stage. Distributed flexibilities should not cause market fragmentation and competition distortion, while 
respecting neutrality, confidentiality, and transparency. In addition, the use of distributed flexibility 
should align with the security criteria in the system.  
In Spanish electricity system [26], [27], [28] currently, new RES generation units can either be installed 
without any subsidies or bid into the auctions organised by the government. Periodically, the government 
opens an auction, where the amount of capacity to be installed is fixed. RES promoters bid for the 
subsidies they want to receive. The last auction was held in July 2017, and the resulting price was zero. 
Therefore, the assigned project will not receive public support. Despite this, the assigned promotions are 
guaranteed at a minimum price in the pool market considering market oscillations. A new Feed-In Tariff 
(FIT) was introduced in 2007. Specifically, the regulated price to be received by PV for each kWh 
produced was very high. This motivated a massive deployment of this kind of installations. Thus, the 
mechanism had to be modified for new installations in 2008. This leads to only installations executed 
until that moment having the right to receive such a high remuneration. In 2012, the subsidies were 
removed for new installations. Finally, in 2013, the retributions still in force was modified and a new 
concept of reasonable profitability was introduced. 
In Denmark RES generation has several technology-dependent support schemes [53]:   
• loan guarantees: Energinet.dk guarantees the loans before constructing wind power plant 
• net metering: Net metering plants are exempt from paying the public service obligation or part of it 
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• Feed-in premium tariff: Electricity generated from renewable energy is paid through premium tariff, 
which includes a bonus payment 
In Norway, grid operators are required to connect renewable energy without discrimination. A quota 
system is used to incentivise renewable introduction. The system includes a certificate trading system, in 
which grid operators prove the percentage of supplied energy is generated from renewable energy.  
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
The SmartNet bids should include information on if they are representing renewable energy or high 
efficiency co-generation. When there is no preference between two bids, if both represents renewable 
energy, the one represents high efficiency co-generation is preferred. Since renewable energy and high 
efficiency co-generation are distinguished from other resources. This enables higher penetration of 
renewable and high efficiency co-generation. 
 Minimum bid size and resolution 3.2.6
The considered documents from European Parliament and the Council do not mention minimum bid size 
for ancillary services. The recast of Regulation documents [6] mentions minimum bids sizes for day-
ahead markets and intraday markets. 
According to WindEurope [42] the Balancing Guideline foresees movement towards smaller balancing 
products (1 MW for mFRR vs currently typically 5MW). It should also be mentioned that WindEurope 
argues in [42] for aggregation of smaller units offering balancing services, rather than reduction of the 
minimum bid size, as aggregated forecasts are more accurate, leading to a more reliable participation of 
wind power in balancing markets.  
According to [23], currently the mFRR (manual Frequency Restoration Reserves) minimum bid size limit 
is 10 MW in Norway/Denmark/ most areas in Sweden., while the mFRR minimum bid size is 5 MW in 
Finland. Similarly, the minimum bid size for aFRR in Spain is 10 MW [27]. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
In local markets it is necessary to have small size bids and resolution in order to enable adequate 
liquidity. SmartNet does not limit the minimum bid size, nor the optimal resolution (it is parameterized), 
however during the course of the project it was decided that bids below 1 kW should not be forwarded to 
the market. It also necessary to keep in mind that in SmartNet the bidding happens per Each node. The 
Italian case, for example, includes approximately 10 000 nodes in the network. This value differs 
significantly from the above-mentioned requirement of 1 MW and one can conclude that nodal 
architecture allows to introduce lower bids, which should enhance liquidity of the market and support 
participation from RES.  
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3.3 The Physical Layer 
 Prioritisation of control traffic (support for network slicing) 3.3.1
The Regulation of Open Access to Internet [19] stipulates that traffic management needed to enable, for 
example, the low latency high reliability multicasting of small real time control signals needed by the 
distributed ancillary services (AS) will be allowed as long as it does not reduce the quality of the normal 
Internet access of the end users. 
The BEREC guidelines [20] clarify the interpretation of the above-mentioned regulation [19]. The 
clarifications are in line with the assumption that traffic management needed to enable the low latency 
transmission of small real time control signals will be allowed as long as it does not reduce the quality of 
the normal Internet access of the end users and network capacity is assured. The provision of special 
services, including communication for power grid automation and ancillary services, is subject to a 
number of conditions, namely i) the network capacity is sufficient to provide the specialized service in 
addition to any Internet Access Service (IAS) provided, ii) specialized services are not usable or offered as 
a replacement for IAS, iii) specialized services are not to the detriment of the availability or general 
quality of the IAS for end-users. 
The SmartNet concept requires that the control signals are always very reliably transmitted to the DER in 
less than 0,5 - 1 minute. That is why it is necessary to have prioritisation, if Internet access connections 
are used for the purpose. The interpretation of “specialized services” will have impact on 
implementations of SmartNet control traffic by allowing the new network slicing methodology in 
software defined networking.  
 Responsibilities and ownership of components and data 3.3.2
The TSO-DSO data management report [13] discusses different concerns from DSOs and TSOs. DSOs are 
concerned about possible misalignment of actions between TSOs, DSOs, and other market players, which 
could lead to a loss of control of the distribution grid and drive inefficient grid expansion. On the other 
hand, TSOs are more concerned with their ability to perform efficient balancing of the overall electricity 
system, to ensure security of supply and fair market functioning. Also, TSOs and DSOs have different 
visions on balancing actions:  
• DSOs’ position is that certain balancing actions could be delegated to them to procure balancing 
services on their network as a subsidiary activity to support TSOs 
• TSOs’ position is that balancing actions should be managed on a wider scale, as local balancing cannot 
ensure an overall optimisation. 
As for the new legislative definitions (not fully implemented yet), such as the Directives, Network Codes 
and similar, the recast Electricity Directive [5] states that ‘eligible parties’ (defined as customers, 
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suppliers, TSOs and DSOs, aggregators, energy service companies, and other parties which provide 
energy or other services to customers) may have access to data of the final customer with their explicit 
consent. The data can include metering data, consumption data, and data required for consumer 
switching. Access to this data should not carry any additional costs to end customers, and regulated 
entities should not profit from providing data services. The data management model should be 
independent of that applied in each member state and ensure equal access. To ensure equal access, DSOs 
shall have specific measures to exclude discriminatory access to data from eligible parties. DSOs also need 
to comply with unbundling conditions when involved in data management of smart metres. TSOs are 
responsible to provide sufficient information to the operator of an interconnected system. 
It is defined in the recast Electricity Regulation [6] that TSOs are responsible for publishing relevant real 
and forecasted data. For example, estimated available transfer capacity of each day, actual and forecasted 
demand, etc. Moreover, TSOs and DSOs need to exchange necessary information and data regarding the 
performance of generation assets and Demand Side Response (DSR) participants, the daily operation of 
their networks, and the long-term plan of network investments. Both TSOs and DSOs need to ensure cost-
efficient network development whilst maintaining a secure and reliable network. 
The EDSO position paper [10] promotes DSOs as Data Manager (DM) to access and handle necessary data. 
It is recommended that DSOs have access to data needed to fulfil their obligations (e.g. Neutral Market 
Facilitator (NMF) and grid operation), and ii) assess the common European data format based on the cost 
and benefit, or alternatively limit it to a common “minimum content”. DSOs also require being fully 
involved in the smart metre developing processes and in the administration of the measured data. On the 
collaboration between TSOs and DSOs, EDSO requests that data transfer between TSO and DSO conform 
to subsidiarity and communication cascade. The communication cascade principle assigns all data and 
control flows to the connecting grid operator. 
 The joint DSO responses [11] states that network operators own the data related to their systems. Based 
on the consultation results, DSOs have the willingness to exchange data and limit the data to a minimum 
content. For example, if the DSOs network data is critical for the provision of fundamental services, an 
equivalent or simplified network model is needed. Furthermore, DSOs argue that Common Grid Model 
(CGM) should not be kept confidential but made transparent. 
 The TSO-DSO data management report [13] discusses that each system operator (TSOs and DSOs) is 
responsible for its own IT system and data communication networks, organised by the system operator, 
as long as the highest security of supply standard is guaranteed. DSOs are responsible to provide relevant 
data to TSOs for grid operation, in the case when TSOs require data from a user connected at the 
distribution network and the data is related to technical needs or specific ancillary service product. 
Different options proposed in the report: i) TSOs access the required data from a DSO connected grid user 
through an aggregator/BSP (Balancing Service Provider); ii) DSOs pass the required data to TSOs; or iii) 
TSOs access the required data via a direct technical solution. 
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ENTSO-E [18] proposes options for TSOs for accessing data related to users connected to the distribution 
network, the options are i) via the respective aggregator or BSP; ii) via the connecting DSOs; or iii) 
directly via the grid user for specific needs. It is also emphasised by ENTSO-E that using 2 out of 3 options 
may create redundancy. 
 CEER position paper [25] suggests that TSOs and DSOs should not only share information and consult 
with each other, but also share information with the market and consult with other market participants, 
to achieve better network management. 
 USEF [36] discusses a Meter Data Company (MDC) role, who is responsible for collecting, modifying, and 
distributing data to eligible parties (e.g. DSO) for calculation and/or verification processes. It also 
proposes different methods for data collection, including i) aggregator collects data and shares the data 
with MDC or MDC has access to sub-meters, if the sub-meters are installed by aggregators; ii) aggregator 
has access to sub-meters, if they are installed by MDC. In addition, the USEF work recommends 
aggregators share basic technical information (e.g. available power, ramping rates, type of flexibility 
services) to the connecting TSOs and DSOs, after signing a contract with a prosumer. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
The Table 5 has previously summarized grid operation roles, including SO, system balancing responsible 
party, and data manager, for each SmartNet coordination scheme. Each network operator manages its 
own data. For the purpose of network balancing and congestion management, relevant data may need to 
be available and communicated between TSO and its connecting DSO. 
 Energy supply for communication and ICT components 3.3.3
Electricity supply is not included in the scope of the existing European network codes that set 
controllability requirements for demand [44] and for generation [45]. Based on the draft standards 
considered in IEC TC8 [21] this may change in the future. 
 Remote controllability of DER 3.3.4
The ENTSO-E Network Codes and the related European (EN) and other draft standards considered in IEC 
TC8 [21] set requirements for remote controllability of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs).  To fulfil 
the target of high penetrations of remotely controllable DERs in 2030, the requirements must be 
implemented within the next few years. Only the new DERs will be required to meet the new codes. There 
must be a long transition time (approx. 10-15 years) for the existing DERs. The requirements are being 
developed now in order to give a more accurate view of situation in 2030. It is also obvious in [21] that 
the existing controllability and remote control interface requirements are very likely to gradually extend 
to smaller units. Eventually, all inverter-based grid connections of significant size may be included. 
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Requirements for remote controllability for Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) are included in the Electric 
Vehicle (EV) to grid communication related draft ISO 15118 standard [46]. 
The new grid connection codes [44], [45] in Europe require remote controllability by DSOs for all 
generators and electricity storages that are type B or above. The sizes of the types vary from country to 
country. In central Europe, type B means all units that have at least 1 MW peak power. Type A refers to all 
units that are smaller than type B with a minimum size of 0.8 kW. For type A units, it requires control 
functions, but remote control interface is not necessary. Extending the control interface requirement to 
type A in a reasonable long transition time (roughly the normal lifetime of the equipment, which is 10 -15 
years) would reduce the implementation costs of Demand Response (DR) services. 
In addition, it is necessary to define adequate requirements for the measurement and control dynamics 
(e.g. response duration, reliability, and immunity to disturbances) of DER technologies in the grid 
connection codes, preferably via standardisation. Otherwise, the risks and costs of engaging the 
functionalities for ancillary service provision may be too high. Standardisation would also reduce the 
implementation costs of distributed flexibility and ancillary services, if the grid connection codes require 
communication interfaces with a common data structure and communication protocol. Therefore, DERs 
must provide services to the DSO or the VPP using remote control signals. Moreover, the EV related 
standard ISO 15118 [46] should use the same communication protocols as the rest of DER remote control 
automation, for communicating with the VPP. 
The present situation in EU is that voltage droops are not required, and the frequency droop requirement 
does not apply to electric energy storage nor Electric Vehicles (EV).  The requirement for the frequency 
droop control is in The Network Code on Requirements for Generators [45].  The Network Code for 
Demand Connection [44] does not include such requirements. 
 In the draft standards (such as prEN 50549 [47]) considered in the IEC TC8 there are requirements for 
both frequency and voltage droops for Distributed Generation (DG), electricity storage, microgrids and 
electric vehicles for type A and bigger, and remote controllability by DSO for type B and bigger. In the 
future, such requirements are likely to appear also in the European grid connection codes for DER.  The 
draft standards do not yet include such requirements for loads although there are reasons to do that, too. 
The joint DSO reply [11] states that DSOs agree with exchanging network information aimed at making 
TSOs aware of the amount of flexibility that can be guaranteed from DERs.  WindEurope [14] suggests 
active power management (upward or downward dispatching) of distributed wind generators can be 
realised through the generators by following signals from the market and/or System Operator (SO), or 
through activating by the SO directly. In addition, ENTSO-E [22] recommends that each SO (not only the 
connecting SO) has direct access to Distributed Flexibility Resource (DFR) technically (direct activation) 
and contractually (direct bid submission and settlement). In addition, ENTSO-E proposes to avoid 
implementations where DSOs act as the interface of DFR to TSOs.  
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The USEF [36] introduces possible aggregation models. Based on the document, although not explicitly 
discussed in [36], one can infer that the control responsibility of the flexible asset is done by the 
aggregator. However, since the prosumer has the final control over its assets, aggregator’s control needs 
to satisfy prosumer’s comfort level. This is expected to vary according to the targeted services. It [36] also 
assumes a standardised setup and interface between the aggregator, the prosumers, and DERs (defined 
as active demand & supply in [36]), to ensure low cost to connect and to serve. 
In Spanish electricity system [31], installations of renewable resources, cogeneration, and waste with 
power higher than 5 MW, or a group whose total power is larger than 5 MW, must be assigned to a 
generation control centre. This will be the interlocutor with the SO (Red Eléctrica de España), who sends 
the installations information in real time and executes convenient instructions, in order to guarantee the 
electrical system reliability. Installations with power higher than 1 MW, or a group with a total power 
larger than 1 MW, must send tele-measurements in real time to the SO. The tele-measurements can be 
sent by the installation owner, its legal representative, or through the distribution company control 
centre. The DSOs will have access to the real time tele-measurements of the installations connected to 
their respective networks. The costs of the control centre installation and maintenance, including 
installation and maintenance of communication channels with the SO, will be borne by the generators 
assigned to it. 
Conclusions and reference to SmartNet 
Remote controllability of DER is an important enabling technology supporting involvement of DER in 
provision of ancillary services. It is particularly important for implementation of outcomes from SmartNet 
project since it is supports submission of small and complex bids. The screening study indicates that 
requirements for remote controllability for generators and storages for type B and above are already 
stipulated in the grid connection codes. The remote control interface for type A is still not necessary. It is 
clear that establishing of infrastructure for controllability of smaller units will require substantial capital 
expenditures. Therefore, extension of the control interface requirement to smaller units (type A) would 
reduce the overall implementation costs of Demand Response (DR) services.  
If the grid connection requirements will be extended to cover different types of DER and smaller DER in 
the future, abundant flexibility becomes ubiquitously available for the distributed provision of ancillary 
services.  That could mitigate or even remove the liquidity problems related to local distributed markets, 
if the markets are designed accordingly. That would also increase the relevance of the market 
architectures developed and compared in SmartNet.   
3.4 Summary of the findings from the screening 
This section summarises the results from the above review of EU legislation relevant for topics of interest 
identified in the SmartNet project and described in Section 2.1.  
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 Market layer 3.4.1
• In the issue related to priority of doing local congestion management by DSO vs centralized TSO 
market: neither the Commission nor the CEER do express any clear position about market solutions. 
There are, however, very several clear preferences from the stakeholders. It appears that 
mechanisms for the procurement of flexibility (either via common procurement or via market at each 
grid level) and the framework (since DSOs are regulated entities) for the recognition of costs is still 
missing.  
• Prequalification of resources in distribution networks: screening indicates two main topics of the 
discussion: i) Which actor (-s)/role (-s) should be involved into the pre-qualification process i.e. TSO, 
DSO individually or in coordinated manner or aggregator ii) What should be the qualification level i.e. 
individual or portfolio. Recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
internal market for electricity makes a general definition of prequalification. It also stipulates that the 
procurement shall be organised in a non-discriminatory way between market participants in the 
prequalification process, either individually or through aggregation. Guideline on electricity defines 
that each balancing service provider intending to provide service, should pass the qualification 
process defined by TSO and if necessary, by DSO. 
• Operation of possible local market (single DSO vs common distribution Market Operator):  recast of 
the Directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity only advocates that regulatory 
framework in the Member States should give incentives to DSOs to use flexibility services to improve 
operational efficiency and distribution network development, e.g. congestion management at 
distribution level. The same document also recommend that DSOs shall procure flexibility services 
via market-based solutions.  
• Relationship with previous markets including GCTs: the only requirement for this in present 
legislative documents is that the participants in the balancing markets shall be allowed to bid as close 
to real-time as possible and at last after the intraday gate closure. 
 Bidding layer 3.4.2
• Possibility to create "virtual" copperplate bids versus nodal bidding: the regulation focuses on correct 
local price signals and transparency in the process of determining the locational signal. The review did 
not identify any legislation about copperplate versus nodal bidding. 
• Definition of bidding products: the legislative acts do not require but open the possibility to 
develop complicated bids.  
• Minimum bid size and resolution: Currently, in practice the size of minimum bid is between 5-
10MW, but a movement towards smaller balancing products (1 MW for mFRR vs currently typically 
5MW) can be expected 
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• Incentivisation mechanism for RES vs price revelation: while in most national markets there are 
legacy Incentivisation mechanisms for RES, there is longer term strategy to apply this only to smaller 
installation or less mature technologies. It is argued that larger installations of mature technologies 
should participate in the markets and phasing out of their subsidies is planned by 2030. 
 Physical layer: 3.4.3
• Prioritisation of control traffic: the SmartNet concept requires that the control signals are always 
very reliable transmitted to the Distributed Energy Resource in less than 0.5-1 minute. There is no 
regulation ensuring this requirement. The regulation is the other way around: traffic management 
need to allow low latency transmission of small real time control signals will be allowed as long as it 
does not reduce the quality of normal internet access of the end users. 
• Responsibility and ownership of components and data: the recast electricity Directive states that 
“eligible parties” (defined as customers, suppliers, TSOs and DSOs, aggregators, energy service 
companies etc) may have access to data of the final customer with their explicit consent.  The review 
did not identify any legislation about ownership of components. 
• Remote controllability of Distributed Energy Resources: The Network Guidelines [44] and [45] 
require remote controllability by DSO for all new generators and electricity storage that are of type B 
and above. In Central Europe, type B means all units that have at least 1 MW peak power. For other 
parts of Europe, the size of type B varies from country to country. In addition, it is necessary to define 
adequate requirements for the measurements and control dynamics (e.g. response duration, 
reliability and immunity to disturbances) of Distributed Energy Resources. The present situation in 
EU is such that voltage droops are not required, and the frequency droops requirement does not 
apply to electric energy storage nor electric vehicles. 
The following topics are covered in the present or proposed European legislation:  
• Market layer: Market session timeline, Nodal market vs zonal, Management of voltage 
constraints, Availability of reserve capacity, Pay-as-bid vs pay-as-clear, Optimisation criterion for 
electricity market design - maximisation of social welfare vs minimum activation costs,  
• Bidding layer: Dimension of bidding zone. 
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4 Conclusions 
The “recast for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal 
market in electricity" [5] writes in its introduction: 
“Short-term electricity markets which allow trading RES-E across borders are key for successful 
integration of RES-E into the market…… The creation of markets which allow participation at 
short notice before actual delivery (so-called "intraday" or "balancing" markets) are a crucial 
step to enable RES-E producers to sell their energy at fair terms and it will also increase liquidity 
in the market. Short-term markets will provide new business opportunities for participants to 
offer "back-up" energy solutions at times of high demand and scarce renewable generation. This 
includes the possibility for consumers to shift their demand ("demand response"), storage 
operators or flexible generators. While dealing with variability in small regions can be very 
expensive, aggregation of variable production over larger areas could help consumers save 
significant amounts of money. Yet, integrated short-term markets are still missing.” 
The project SmartNet aims at providing market, data exchange and ICT architectures for optimized 
interaction between TSOs and DSOs for the acquisition of ancillary services (reserve and balancing, 
voltage regulation, congestion management).  
The SmartNet project proposes five coordination schemes: 
• Centralized AS market 
• Local AS market 
• Shared balancing responsibility 
• Common TSO-DSO AS market 
• Integrated flexibility market.  
The schemes are briefly explained in Section 1.1.1, while more detailed explanation can be found in [50]. 
The different coordination schemes all have specific benefits and attention points related to the TSO grid 
operation, the DSO grid operation, other market participants and the functioning of the market in general. 
This deliverable makes a comprehensive screening of the present and proposed regulation with respect 
to key regulatory issues of interest for SmartNet. The investigated topics are structured into three 
categories:  market, bidding and dispatch and physical, called "layers" in SmartNet.  For each of these 
categories, a number of specific topics are identified and investigated. For more detailed explanation of 
the topics, see Section 2.1. The documents considered in this report have been issued by several types of 
stakeholders including: 
• Governmental Organisations (European Commission, Governments) 
• Organisations working with different aspects of Regulation and Standardisation (Regulators, CEER, 
ENTSO-E, IEC etc) 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 68  
 
• Interest organisations as Industrial Associations and similar (ENTSO-E, EDS4SG, WindEurope, Energy 
Network Association) 
• Other (ETIP-SNET, USEF) 
The following Table 10 shows some results and conclusions derived from this documents screening. 
Table 10 Summary of the screening study 
Layer Topic of interest Conclusion  
M
a
rk
e
t 
la
y
e
r 
Market sessions timeline Need for an overall harmonisation process across Europe. 
Energy to be traded in periods, which are at least as short as 
imbalance settlement (requirement of 15 min from 2025-
01-01). The trade should be moved as close as possible to 
operation. Non-discriminatory access to the markets and 
creation of level-playing field. 
Nodal market vs. zonal   Zonal organisation is the preferred model in Europe. The 
nodal pricing model allows incorporating bottlenecks into 
the pricing. This type of organization has been successfully 
applied at several markets in USA.  
Local congestion management 
by DSOs vs centralized TSO 
market 
DSOs and TSOs to be responsible for handling congestion in 
their respective grids. Balancing remains under TSOs 
responsibility. Rules for use of flexibility resources across 
grids need coordination with a clear framework. Centralised 
TSO market for procurement of resources is expected to 
have higher efficiency and liquidity, but an extension to 
distribution could prove computationally challenging. Local 
markets could, by contrast be illiquid and prone to exercise 
of market power.    
Prequalification of resources in 
distribution networks 
Prevailing position is that the “static” prequalification 
process in the distribution network should be replaced by a 
coordinated TSO and DSO process.  
Inclusion of constraints 
(device-related) from 
distribution grid bidders 
No present legal requirements for inclusion of device-
related constraints. Proposal for inclusion of certain 
requirements on portfolio-level are advanced by 
stakeholders.  
Operation of possible local Several key stakeholders including ENTSO-E support 
creation of a single market place for balancing and solving 
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market congestions, with that meaning that the different markets 
(and their relevant responsible) should work in a shared 
database in order to avoid double awarding of the same bid.  
Management of voltage 
constraints 
Voltage control is formally defined as non-frequency 
ancillary service and thus shall be allowed to be procured 
by DSOs in market-based manner (both active and reactive 
power can be used for voltage control). According to 
common report TSOs and DSOs should agree on voltage 
control parameters at the border of the networks.  
Availability of reserve capacity Legal requirements requesting separate procurement of 
balancing energy and capacity, separate procurement of up- 
and down regulation capacity. At present TSOs are 
responsible for conducting optimal reserve capacity 
provision through market-based methods (FRR+RR), short 
term. 
Relationship with previous 
markets 
In the recent European legislative documents [6]" the 
market participants shall be allowed to bid into balancing 
markets as close to real time operation as possible, and at 
least after the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time - at 
most 1 hour before the delivery", which means even shorter 
terms 
Pay-as-bid vs. pay-as-clear EU legislation and guidelines suggest using pay-as-clear 
pricing model. However, several EU countries are presently 
still adopting pay-as-bid. 
Optimisation criterion for 
electricity market design – 
maximization of social welfare 
vs. minimum activation costs 
Maximisation of the social welfare prevails even if some 
present real time markets, by contrast, minimize purchase 
costs of the needed services.  
Roles and Responsibilities in 
the context of the 
prequalification, procurement, 
activation and settlement of AS 
markets including 
observability 
Gradual evolving of roles and responsibilities, especially for 
DSOs, towards more active role. This for example includes 
managing the local flexibility resources to improve 
operational efficiency (voltage regulation) and solve local 
congestion. However, balancing market responsibility will 
stay in TSO hands as stated by the Clean Energy for all 
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European package.  
B
id
d
in
g
 l
a
y
e
r 
Ancillary services considered 
in the screened documents 
According to the EU Directive on common rules for IEM [5] 
"…ancillary service’ means a service necessary for the 
operation of a transmission or distribution system including 
balancing and non-frequency ancillary services but not 
congestion management". 
Possibility to create “virtual” 
copperplate bids vs nodal 
bidding 
The recast IEM regulation proposal (Clean Energy for all 
European package) highlights locational price signals, 
which are needed for efficient investment into zonal 
electricity model. No other information was found in the 
screened documents. Copperplate bidding favours trading 
whereas nodal bidding provides a more transparent 
dispatch, with less request of activating countertrade by the 
TSO. 
Possibility for bidding negative 
prices in AS Markets 
This is issue is not directly discussed on the screened 
documents. However, the tendency in energy markets is 
everywhere to enable negative prices to give signals also in 
case of excess of resources. 
Dimensioning of bidding zones Recast of Regulation for IEM defines that the bidding zone 
should be defined on the basis of long-term congestions in 
the transmission network, and the zones should not have 
structural congestions. The zones can be modified (splitting, 
merging and adjusting) but should be the same for all 
market time frames.  
Incentivisation mechanisms for 
RES vs price revelation in AS 
Market 
It is argued that larger installations of mature technologies 
should participate in the markets and phasing out of their 
subsidies is planned by 2030. 
Minimum bid size and 
resolution 
The screened legal documents do not define min size for the 
bids. Several stakeholders favour allowing smaller bids for 
supporting participation of RES in the ancillary services. 
The issue is to what extent this should be supported by a 
decrease of the minimum market threshold or rather by the 
set-up of aggregators for the small DER resources. 
P h Prioritisation of control traffic Regulation of Open Access to Internet allows traffic 
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(support for network slicing) - 
how prioritisation for ICT 
control traffic for energy 
system management is ensured 
so to guarantee secure system 
operation. 
management for control signals needed for distributed 
ancillary services as long as this does not reduce quality for 
other end-users. Otherwise, provision of these services is a 
subject to a number of conditions.  
Responsibilities and ownership 
of components and data 
New tasks and responsibilities require changes in the rules 
for data sharing among key market actors. However, an 
increase of data sharing is the natural consequence of 
increased coordination needs between TSO, DSO and the 
other market subjects. 
Energy supply for 
communication and ICT 
components (how to ensure 
sufficient power backup for 
ICT) 
The issue was not covered in the screened documents 
Remote controllability of DER The new Codes and draft standards define requirements for 
remote controllability of DER (new units above 1 MW). It is 
expected that these requirements will be extended towards 
smaller units.  
 
A general conclusion from the review is that EU regulations are not directly addressing several of the 
topics identified by SmartNet, i.e. crucial topics for large-scale utilisation of Distributed Energy Resources 
in ancillary services, as for example timing of the markets. Without common EU regulations different 
solutions will develop in the distribution areas, the most diverse and non-harmonized solutions will be 
implemented in agreement between DSOs and adjoining TSO (e.g. nation- or region-wise under influence 
of TSO). This will not necessarily hamper the utilisation of local flexibility in the transmission grids, but it 
will certainly make more difficult the development towards cross-border utilisation of distributed energy 
resources 
The present and proposed European regulation points to the Members States for providing relevant 
framework, e.g. in "The recast for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common 
rules for the internal market in electricity"[6]: 
Member States shall provide the necessary framework to allow and incentivise distribution 
system operators to procure services in order to improve efficiency in the operation and 
development of the distribution system, including local congestion management. In particular, 
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regulatory framework shall enable distribution system operators to procure services from 
resources such as distributed generation, demand response and storage…… 
Furthermore, the same document requires that transmission system operators shall cooperate with 
others, e.g.: 
• In procuring ancillary services from market participants to ensure operational security, the 
transmission system operator shall ….  and cooperate as necessary with neighbouring transmission 
system operators 
• The transmission system operator shall ensure that the procurement of balancing services and …. 
non-frequency ancillary services ensure efficient participation of all market participants including 
renewable energy sources, demand response, energy storage facilities and aggregators, in particular 
by requiring regulatory authorities and transmission operators in close cooperation with all market 
participant, to define technical modalities for participation in these markets …… 
The decision shall be done by each Member State and each regulator and in cooperation between 
transmission system operators. Without more common and comprehensive basis of EU regulation, a 
number of non-harmonized solutions will develop, and this will delay if not completely hamper the 
development of an internal European market related to ancillary services. Aggregators that wants to act 
on markets in several countries will have to adapt to different solution. 
This includes the latest "Recast for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the council on the 
internal market for electricity" [6] defining principles for setting bidding zones presuming that zonal 
organisation is the agreed and preferred model. SmartNet argument for selection of nodal market 
organisation is that grid constraints will be considered during the market clearing process.  
When it comes to the stakeholders' opinions, currently the situation is that ENTSO-E suggests that all 
congestion management needs, both for TSOs and DSOs, should be fulfilled by a common bid submission 
process from providers of distributed flexibility resources [18] in document "Distributed Flexibility and 
the value of TSO/DSO cooperation". A common process will among other ensure liquidity of the market 
[18]. ENTSO-E supports a common centralized solution for three system and grid services: 
• For electricity balancing from Frequency Restoration Reserves and Replacement Reserves.  
• For internal or cross-border congestion management in the transmission network 
• For congestion management in the distribution network  
Disregarding the selected approach (centralised or not) it is advised by ENTSO-E  [18] that the market 
design should allow both DSOs and TSOs to set limitations and to activate flexibility resources based on 
the connection point of the resource as it is advised by ENTSO-E.  
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On the other hand “TSO-DSO data management report4” [13]  mentions different points of attention 
coming from DSOs and TSOs, where DSOs are essentially concerned about possible misalignments of 
actions between TSOs, DSOs and other market players, which could lead to loss of control over the 
distribution grid and drive inefficient grid expansion. DSOs think that certain balancing actions could be 
delegated to them to procure balancing services on their network as a subsidiary activity to support TSOs 
(see page 15 in [13]). 
                                                                   
4 Common publication of ENTSO-E, EDSO for SmartGrids, Eurelectric, GEODE and CEDEC 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Overview of the studied documents (summaries) 
Document: 01. 2030 Energy Strategy 
The 2030 energy strategy documents set out the EU-wide climate and energy objectives and targets to be 
achieved by 2030, provide and discuss policy framework to achieve them, and provide key indicators that 
will be used to measure the progress. Two documents for the website have been looked at for the 
SmartNet (others related to efficiency were omitted). 
 
Doc 1a: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030 
Main objectives of the EU policy framework include: 
• greenhouse gas emission reduction, 
• improved competition and integration of internal energy market 
• improving energy security through integrated markets, integration of renewables, 
infrastructure investments, energy savings improvement and research and innovation 
• flexibility on the national level to develop best national plans to achieve common EU goal, 
while strengthening cooperation among Member States 
Key elements of the policy framework based on experiences form the implementation of the current 
framework include: 
• possible re-evaluation of the GHG targets and reforming of the Emission Trading System, 
• further strengthening of competitive internal energy market, 
• ensuring availability of affordable energy to customers on competitive bases, 
• maintaining security of energy supply by facilitating the transformation of energy cross-
border interconnections, storage potential and smart grids to manage demand, 
• improving energy efficiency. 
Main relevance for the SmartNet: emphasis of the framework on integration of renewables, 
competitiveness of energy markets, flexibility of national plans to choose best course of action, emphasis 
on customers’ choice of energy supplier and ability to produce, role of Smart Grids to help achieve 
sustainable energy systems, encouraging R&I and new technology solutions, as well as new approaches to 
state aid for new technology but with a need not to distort competition. 
 
Doc1b: Impact Assessment 
The impact analysis document looks into potential scenarios under the proposed policy framework, 
therefore, benefits of meeting the 2030 energy strategy are analysed based on results obtained from 
modelling the scenarios. This is a supporting document for targets discussed in Doc 1a, and it is not of an 
interest for analysis in T6.2 
The 2030 energy strategy documents outline problems that the energy system will face, considering the 
current progress towards the 2020 targets. Four major general challenges that the 2030 framework aims 
to address is emphasised, which are greenhouse gas reduction, medium to long-term security of supply, 
balancing between long investment cycle in energy infrastructure and utilisation of current facilities, and 
a more sustainable and economical energy system. To address these problems, the 2030 climate and 
energy targets are set out. Since the series of the 2030 energy strategy documents provide general energy 
system guidelines for the period between 2020 and 2030, the outcomes of SmartNet project are relevant 
for the progress on the climate and energy 2030 targets. 
 
Document: 02. Energy Roadmap 2050 
It is a Low-Carbon economy roadmap of 2050, which studies the main challenges to achieve the EU 
decarbonization objective of 2050, meanwhile keeping the energy supply competitive and secure. 
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It states that to make this energy system transition possible and the main target achievable, the EU needs 
to take urgent actions already today. Decisions being taken today are already shaping the energy system 
of 2050.  
It distinguishes ten challenges/conditions/steps which should be met to achieve this new energy system 
transition and hit the desired target of decarbonization. 
• Prioritize the fully implementation of EU Energy 2020 strategy 
• To be more energy efficient in all aspects/layers 
• Continuous increase in RES (Renewable Energy Sources), first achieving the 20 % renewable 
energy target for 2030 
• Technological innovation 
• Well-designed energy market which allows new ways of cooperation 
• New investment will be needed throughout the energy system 
• Collective responsibility 
• Safety and security should be respected 
• More coordinated international energy relation 
• Member-States and investors need concrete milestones 
Document: 03. Final 10-year ETIP SNET R&I roadmap covering 2017-26 
The Research Innovation Roadmap (RIR) of ETIP SNET is constructed with three main building blocks. 
The first building block is a mapping of the main guidelines of the EU climate and Energy Union policies: 
this analysis yields a set of impacts of these policies on the future energy system, with a focus on the 
power system for the decade to come. The impacts are then translated into the main and most probable 
evolutions of the power system in the decade to come, as a result of the “policy push” framework. These 
evolutions are listed in terms of issues related to generation, loads, network infrastructures, digitalisation 
of the network, cooperation between network operators, technologies, integration within the energy 
system and market. 
The second building block is the definition of the future challenges for the network operators as a result 
of the evolutions of the power system.  Four major challenges mentioned in the report are: 
• More intermittent generation 
• New loads 
• Integration of the pan-European electricity network 
• Internal energy market 
The third building block is a mapping between the future challenges to be addressed by network 
operators, together with the other stakeholders of the power (energy) system, and the structure of the 
RIR. 
The document does not provide direct answers, but rather points out the key areas for the future R&I.  
 
Document: 04. R&D Roadmap 2017-2026 
This R&I roadmap published by ENTSO-E focuses on R&I activities to support TSOs with integration of 
different technologies (e.g. demand responses, energy storage, etc.), and to improve interaction between 
TSOs and DSOs. 
 In this regard, ENTSO-E promotes vertical and horizontal cooperation: 
• Vertical cooperation - TSOs should collaborate with universities, industries, generation 
companies, DSOs, market entities 
• Horizontal cooperation - tends to enhance the TSO-TSO cooperation which is aiming to fulfil 
common targets. 
Functional objectives of TSOs’ R&I activities are maintained and updated under five categories, including 
• power system modernisation, 
o Optimal grid target 
o Smart Asset management 
o New materials and technologies 
o Environmental challenges and Stakeholders 
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• security and system stability, 
o Grid Observability 
o Grid controllability 
o Expert systems and tools 
o Reliability and resilience 
o Enhanced ancillary services 
o power system flexibility, 
o Storage integration 
o Demand response 
o RES forecast 
o Flexible grid use 
o Interaction with non-electrical energy networks 
• power system economics and efficiency, 
o Market-grid integration 
o Business models 
o Flexible market design 
• ICT and digitalisation of power system. 
o Big data 
o Standardisation and data exchange 
o Internet of things 
o Cybersecurity 
The document lists the impacts and benefits of the R&I roadmap: 
• Sustainable: enables RES integration and decarbonization targets 
• Secure and Competitive: High system flexibility and security with a strong transmission 
network 
• European resource synergies: maximizes the outcomes while reducing the standard costs 
• European leadership in technology 
The roadmap also updates and assesses the current progress of R&I activities. Based on the current 
progress, it reviews gaps and thus recommends three R&I areas with high priorities, which are asset 
management, joint TSO and DSO activities, and market design. Barriers and recommendations of 
regulatory framework for R&I activities are proposed in the roadmap as well. 
Outcomes of SmartNet project should align with the proposed expected outcomes of the functional 
objectives. In addition, the roadmap highlights that joint TSO and DSO activities is one of the high priority 
R&I area, and SmartNet looks into the coordination schemes that interact between TSO and DSOs. 
Therefore, SmartNet need to demonstrate that, as a research project, its outcomes are able to support 
TSOs with utilisation of various technologies, and to improve TSOs and DSOs interactions. 
 
Document: 05. "DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common 
rules for the internal market in electricity" 
The Directive proposal is an update of the rules for the internal market of electricity. The document aims 
to pursue the goal of creation the internal energy market and reduce application of fragmented national 
rules and uncoordinated policies. The Directive covers several areas, where the following are most 
relevant for the present project: 
• Lays down the main principles ensuring that the EU electricity market is competitive, 
consumer-centred, flexible and non-discriminatory  
• Reinforces the existing and introduces the new rights for the customers, including free choice 
of suppliers or aggregators, ability to engage in Demand Response, self-generation and self-
consumption. 
• Highlights the role of independent aggregators and demand response principles.  
• Clarifies tasks for DSOs, especially procuring of network services to flexibility and integration 
of EVs and data services.  
• Summarises the general rules applicable to TSOs, largely based on the existing text.  
• Sets rules for unbundling as developed in the 3rd Energy Package.  
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• Describes rules related to establishment, powers and duties of the independent energy 
regulators.  
Document: 06. "REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the 
internal market for electricity" 
The document proposes common rules for the internal electricity market. In general, the proposal defines 
frames for the concept in the SmartNet project:  
• It focuses on involving the demand side in balancing the supply 
• It is setting fundamental principles for integrated markets which facilitate aggregation of 
distributed demand and supply. 
• Underlines the need for cooperation between distribution and transmission system operators 
for coordinated access to resources such as distributed generation, energy storage or demand 
response since those resources may support particular needs of both the distribution and the 
transmission system. 
• Improves pre-existing rules on the consumers' possibility to share their data with suppliers 
and service providers by clarifying the roles of the parties responsible for data management 
and by setting a common European data format to be developed by the Member States. 
The proposal is at a more general level than the information specified in the SmartNet scheme.  
There are three documents: 
1. The main document. Most of the below information is from this document 
2. Annex document about "Functions of regional operational centre" (Annex 1) 
3. Correlation table (Annex 2) 
 
Document: 07. Capacity Allocation & Congestion Management 
The 2015/1222 EU CACM Regulation (Capacity allocation and Congestion management), which 
establishes the guidelines on capacity allocation and congestion management, entered into force on 14 
August 2015. 
Unlike other European regulations adopted so far, which are configured as "Network Codes" and 
therefore provide a complete set of rules ready to be implemented at national level, the CACM is an 
"orientation" of the European Commission, which contains harmonization rules de minimis and refers to 
subsequent acts of regulation the definition of some "terms and conditions or methodologies" necessary 
to fully implement its objectives. 
These "terms and conditions or methodologies" must be developed in concert by all the network 
operators (TSOs) and the appointed market operators (NEMO) and approved by all the national 
regulatory authorities of the Member States through their own deliberative acts. 
In this regard, regulators set up a platform (European Regulatory Forum, ERF) on a voluntary basis to 
facilitate the adoption of joint decisions on approval processes under the CACM  
Article. 9 of the CACM Regulation describes the procedures for adopting the "terms and conditions or 
methodologies" and the related fields of applications. For 13 areas, the approval procedure involving all 
national regulators will be necessary, for another 8 areas will be called to jointly approve only the 
regulators of the same electric region and finally for 6 areas the independent approval of each individual 
regulator will be necessary, for a total of 27 areas of intervention. 
 
Document: 08 Clean Energy for all Europeans (communication) 
The document starts by reminding the reader on the targets for energy efficiency (30% by 2030) and 
renewables (27% by 2030) set by the commission. It continues by emphasizing the overarching 
commitment of the present legislative proposal: set a level playing field for all technologies across 
domains and timeframes relevant in European power systems.  
In short, the main messages provided by this communication (which are relevant to the SmartNet 
project) are: 
• Market rules should be adapted to facilitate market access to distributed resources, while 
managing variability and ensuring security of supply (SoS). 
• Rules should allow shorter term trading (reflecting characteristics/necessities of RES) 
• Allow participation of renewables to all market segments (incl. system services) 
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• Priority of dispatch will remain for small scale renewable installations/demonstrations 
• Consumers will be able to offer demand response directly or through aggregators 
• No messages/position on DSO-TSO cooperation 
 
Document: 09. Clean Energy for all Europeans - additional set of documents (recast IEM regulation 
& recast IEM directive) 
This document clarifies and proposes rules/approaches for electricity markets across all timeframes. The 
proposed rules/approaches have an impact on inter-linked subjects such as (but not limited to): 
• Market participation: supporting aggregation, promoting a level-playing field, emphasizing 
responsibility of all market participants, … 
• Trade & prices: minimum bid size (1 MW or lower), alignment of product design and 
generation/load mix characteristics, removing electricity price limits (or set it to VOLL), … 
• Dispatching, re-dispatching and curtailment: keeping priority of dispatch (selected 
technologies), supporting market-based mechanisms for re-dispatching, advocating for 
curtailment limits and compensation, … 
• Incentives, network access & congestion management: supporting market-based solutions for 
solving congestions, endorsing the provision of incentives to DSOs to procure services, … 
• Cooperation DSO-TSO: on relevant information sharing and on coordinated access and use of 
resources. 
Document: 10. EDSO position paper on the Clean Energy Package 
The document explains the position of DSOs with respect to the points proposed by the clean energy 
package. They focus on few very specific aspects such as the role as market facilitator, the possibility of 
owning flexible devices, the ownership/availability of the data and their willingness to be privileged 
stakeholders of regulatory consultations. 
Particularly interesting are the aspects related to the procurement and use of flexibility by DSOs 
(suggesting DSOs could own and operate storage and other devices) for non-commercial activities, but 
only for the management of network critical situations. In this regard, EDSO advocates for a sound 
framework allowing the recovery of related costs. 
 
Document: 11. Joint DSO Reply to consultations on Generation and Load Data Provision 
Methodology v.2 and Common Grid Model Methodology v.2 
The document reports the feedback of CEDEC, EDSO4SG, EURELECTRIC and GEODE to two public 
consultations on the data (including grid model) exchange between TSO-DSO, as proposed by ENTSO-E. 
The document includes in a schematic way the various feedback of this consultation to 9 different points. 
Some interesting point on DSO voltage level competency and DSO willingness of providing data can be 
deduced. 
 
Document: 12. Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan 
 
The SET plan reviews the future trends of energy system and policy, including 
• Energy system decarbonisation 
• Security of energy supply 
• Competitive and sustainable energy system 
• Improving energy efficiency 
• Diverse and cost-effective technologies for energy supplies 
• Requirement of further solutions from innovations 
Four key challenges to achieve secure, competitive and sustainable energy system are proposed in the 
plan, with sub themes under each challenge. 
Challenge 1: Active customers engagement 
• Better understanding, information exchanges and market adaption to active customers 
• Enable engagement through innovative technologies, products and services 
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Challenge 2: Increase energy efficiency 
• In buildings 
• In heating and cooling sector 
• In industry and services 
Challenge 3: System optimisation (with various energy carriers, e.g. energy storage) 
• Development of smarter European power network and improve synergies between member 
states 
• Integration of energy storage and other energy carriers (e.g. hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles) 
• Providing flexibility, secure and cost-effective solutions to the energy system 
• Development of local/urban level system optimisation (smart cities/communities) 
Challenge 4: Secure, cost-effective, clean and competitive supply 
• Integration with renewable energy resources 
• Enabling carbon capture storage technologies and increasing efficiency of fossil fuel 
generators 
• Safe and efficient nuclear system operation 
• Developing sustainable biofuels for the European transportation energy sector (e.g. hydrogen 
and fuel cell vehicles) 
In addition, there are cross cutting aspects between the energy system transition and the impacts on 
European societies, which requires 1) better education and training, 2) the definitions of policy to 
support the social, the environmental and the economic aspects of the energy system, and 3) persistent 
innovation funding for energy efficiency and energy supply. 
  
Potential R&I activities to address these challenges are categorised under 9 sub-themes. Themes 1, 2, 6 
and 8 are relevant to SmartNet project. 
 
Document: 13. TSO–DSO DATA MANAGEMENT REPORT 
This report aims at sharing recommendations on common European principles and criteria for data and 
information exchanges between TSOs and DSOs. The work is divided into four core topics: 
• establish a common understanding of terms; 
• define context and objectives of data management; 
• define key principles of data management; 
• define needs and uses for data management. 
Main outcomes of five use cases are mentioned in this report, and the use cases’ details are given in the 
Appendix 1. The use cases are: 
• Congestion management 
• Balancing 
• Use of flexibility 
• Real-time control and supervision 
• Network planning 
Document: 14. WindEurope Views on the TSO-DSO coordination - Enabling flexibility from 
distributed wind power 
The document touches upon relevant open issues (barriers) affecting TSO-DSO coordination and 
proposes options to deal with these issues.  
In general, the document acknowledges that DSOs are not encouraged to implement innovative solutions 
to operational challenges due to the shortcomings of current regulatory framework. In the same line, it 
states that TSOs are not able yet to access flexibility resources directly connected to the distribution grid 
due to the limitations of current DSO-TSO coordination schemes. 
To tackle those issues, the document suggests that more efforts are done in respect to DSO-TSO 
coordination, aggregation strategies and facilitation of market access. More specifically, the document: 
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• Asks for a clear definition of roles and interaction for DSOs and TSOs 
• Promotes the use of a common centralized marketplace for AS, where all types of resources 
are able to participate. 
• Promotes a technology neutral procurement of services without disregarding grid 
requirements and needs at all levels. 
• Suggest exploring new connection approaches (non-firm grid connections). 
• Propose a set of principles to enhance DSO-TSO cooperation 
o Equal rights and opportunities to all resources, which requires a coordination model 
that allows the procurement of AS services at Dx in a clear, easy to understand, 
reliable, cost-efficient and fast manner. 
o Only one responsible for system balancing; the TSO. 
o Services should be procured to solve distribution congestions; by the DSO. 
o Ensure coherence between dispatching orders (TSO) and distribution operational 
constraints (DSO) 
o AS procurement and distribution services should be market-based, transparent, non-
discriminatory and neutral 
Document: 15. Guideline on Electricity Balancing (EB) 
This regulation, which applies to the EU transmission networks and interconnections, sets out rules that 
guide the functioning of electricity balancing market for 
• The procurement of available balancing capacity 
• The activation of balancing energy 
• The financial settlement of balancing responsible parties. 
The aim of proposing this regulation is to achieve optimal operation of the EU transmission electricity 
network, together with increasing integration with renewable resources and providing benefits to 
customers. 
The target model is an exchange of TSO-TSO resources using offers for different products collected and 
sorted according to economic merit order list. There is a great absence in balancing markets it is not 
possible to accept a bid/offer for congestion management. For each resource the NC EB envisages the 
development of a centralized platform that collects the offers of the various control areas and allows the 
procurement of the various TSOs. Within one year (December 2018) the TSOs must develop a price 
proposal based on the marginal price and exclude offers for other uses and by eliminating any price limits 
(cap and floor) 
The TSOs that manage central dispatch systems can certify themselves as such with the approval of the 
National Regulatory Authority; as a consequence, a number of specific provisions apply to these systems 
which protect their specificity. 
Since SmartNet project looks into TSO-DSO interaction market schemes and procurement of ancillary 
services, the TSO operation of balancing market should comply with this regulation. 
 
Document: 16. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR REINFORCING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN TSOs AND 
DSOs 
This general guideline starts from reviewing the challenges that TSOs and DSOs are facing with. Based on 
the challenges, it highlights the need of cooperation between TSOs and DSOs  in order to ensure security 
and stability of power systems. Three opportunities are identified for the interactions between TSOs and 
DSOs, which are 
• Coordinated access to resources, 
• Regulatory stability, 
• Grid visibility and grid data. 
By close cooperation between TSOs and DSOs, it will benefit 
• Customers with lower energy cost and security of supply, 
• Markets with integration of demand responses and renewable energy, 
• The decision-making progress between TSOs, DSOs, and grid uses with better and easier 
solutions, 
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• The grid with economical reinforcement costs, 
• Grid resources with efficient long-term lifetime. 
For the aim to achieve better TSOs and DSOs cooperation, three areas are anticipated to be improved. 
These areas are 
• TSOs and DSOs roles and responsibilities, 
• Procurement of flexibility in the market, 
• Technical requirements that enable integration with DERs and new technologies, and 
network planning and operation. 
At last, TSOs and DSOs need to work together on knowledge sharing and understanding, together with 
NRAs and European Commission, to realise the TSOs/DSOs close cooperation. 
This report provides preliminary guidelines for the cooperation between TSOs and DSOs, with the advent 
of various energy technologies and flexibilities. A brief review of potential areas where the TSOs and 
DSOs need to work together are included in this guideline report. Moreover, the TSOs/DSOs interactions 
should comply with the guidelines in this report. 
 
Document: 18. Distributed Flexibility and the Value of TSO/DSO Cooperation 
The document postulates ENTSO-E’s key recommendations for the integration of distributed flexibility 
resources (DFR) into the internal energy market.  
Key recommendations: 
• Products: Joint (DSO & TSO) definition of a limited set of DFR products 
• Congestions: DSOs & TSOs should be able to set limitations or activate DFR (close to real time) 
considering the geographical location of the assets in a bid. 
• Balancing: availability of contracted balancing reserves must be ensured. 
• Use: Activation should be such that it gives the highest value to the flexibility provider.  
• Market: Single marketplace for collecting and mutually coordinate activations of distributed 
flexibility 
 
Document: 19. "REGULATION (EU) 2015/2120 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL measures concerning open internet access" 
The EU regulation 2015/2120 aims that all internet access connections give open, non-discriminatory 
and equal access to the internet. The principle of technological neutrality means that the regulation 
neither impose nor discriminate in favor of the use of a particular type of technology. It does not allow 
prioritization of traffic, but service level differentiation of specific categories of traffic in terms of latency, 
for example, is allowed in order to optimise the overall quality and user experience. Reasonable traffic 
management measures, to differentiate the quality of service e.g. new machine-to-machine 
communication services are allowed by providers of internet access services, but they should be 
transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate, and should not be based on commercial 
considerations. The regulation aims at removing the problem that a significant number of end-users are 
affected by traffic management practices which block or slow down specific applications, services or 
terminal equipment due to commercial reasons.  
 
Depending on the interpretations, the EU regulation 2015/2120 may promote or hinder the prioritization 
of grid communications. The intention seems to be that traffic management needed to enable the low 
latency transmission of small real time control signals will be allowed as long as it does not reduce the 
quality of the normal internet access of the end users and network capacity is assured. It would be good 
to make sure that this possibility is not removed in the future development and interpretation of the EU 
regulation 2015/2120. 
 
Document: 20. BEREC Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of European Net 
Neutrality Rules 
The BEREC guidelines aim to clarify the interpretation of the regulation (EU) 2015/2120. The 
clarifications are in line with the assumption that traffic management needed to enable the low latency 
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transmission of small real time control signals will be allowed as long as it does not reduce the quality of 
the normal Internet access of the end users and network capacity is assured. Such reliable low latency 
transmission of small real-time control signals in necessary for the activation of the SmartNet ancillary 
services. The ancillary services need that the control signals are sent to very many DER simultaneously. 
BEREC uses the term “specialised services” as a short expression for “services other than internet access 
services which are optimised for specific content, applications or services, or a combination thereof, 
where the optimization is necessary in order to meet the requirements of the content, applications or 
services for a specific level of quality” (ref. Article 3(5)). This topic is important for SmartNet. If the new 
network slicing methodology of software defined networking is considered either as “specialised 
services” or as a technology allowed in the implementation of “specialised services” such as distributed 
ancillary services for power systems, commercial networks may provide services that are similar to 
today’s dedicated (separate) networks. 
 
Document: 21. IEC TC8 System aspects of electrical energy supply 
The IEC TC8 is a technical committee preparing and coordinating, in co-operation with other TC/SCs the 
development of international standards and other deliverables with emphasis on overall system aspects 
of electricity supply systems. Thus, it prepares and coordinates very many draft documents.  Among other 
things it provides a good view on the development of grid connection requirements. The draft standards 
are not available outside the standardization committees. The drafts are also evolving, and this review 
was done in March 2018.     
Grid connection requirements include requirements on controllability for DER (now mainly for different 
generators and electric energy storage systems and but in the future most likely also for microgrids and 
flexible loads) and related communication interfaces of DER for enabling services to support the power 
system.  These requirements include 
• possibility to control via an external communication interface 
o active power 
o reactive power 
o drop of the local voltage and frequency control loop 
• minimum size limit of these requirements. 
Thus grid connection requirement documents and drafts tell what local control functions and remote 
controllability can be required to readily exist in DER in 2030 thus enabling SmartNet systems to control 
the devices without additional local costs of connecting DER controllability to the ancillary services.  
 
Document: 22. Distributed Flexibility and the value of TSO/DSO Cooperation (working paper) 
In this working paper ENTSO-e discusses potential uses of distributed flexibility resources (DFR), as well 
as a market design for the procurement of services based on these resources and responsibilities of 
actors within the proposed design. 
In their view, such a marketplace should, 
• Collect bids (with locational information) for balancing and congestion management 
processes 
• Allow TSOs and DSOs to manage their own merit order lists (MOLs) 
• Enable the activation of bids either directly by SOs or by the market  
• Prioritize the use of DFR based on "where they provide the highest value to the whole system"   
In respect to responsibilities, ENTSO-e suggest actions to be performed by balancing service providers 
(BSPs) and system operators (SO)  
 
Document 23. Unlocking Flexibility: Nordic TSO Discussion paper on third-party aggregators 
The aim of the discussion paper is to develop harmonized solutions for integrating aggregators in the 
Nordic electricity markets. Increasing the share of the renewable energy sources increases the need of the 
balancing power; flexibility from both supply and demand side. One way to increase flexibility in the 
market is enabling the smooth integration of aggregators as a new market entity. This might require a 
new market design, which allows fair and competitive solutions providing socio-economic efficiency. 
Hence, the paper studies possible approaches/models to integrate aggregators from a TSO viewpoint. 
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The paper focuses on the role of aggregator as the key role allowing smaller resources to participate in 
the market and relates on some models of aggregation experimented in Nordic pilots. The debate on 
aggregation is polarized: new actors point out there are electricity markets hold barriers preventing them 
to enter, whereas conventional ones lament lack of profitability. 
The main challenges of integrating aggregation seen from a TSO side are the followings: 
1. The Nordic balancing market is for larger units/consumers; There is a need to apply an EU standard 
of 1MW for FRR, it means there is a need to lower the bid size. Lowering bid size requires from all 
market actors to develop solutions for electronic bid activation ordering. Bringing down equipment 
cost would help. Data hubs for smart meters are being developed by Nordic TSOs. However, privacy 
issues are to be safeguarded for date from connection point and consumer.  
2. Online metering for resources participating in balancing markets is needed. Online metering for a 
smaller resource is considered costly and challenging for the aggregator business model.  
• The following major issues/rules are discussed in developed models for integrating 
aggregation. 
• Balance responsibility- all market actors have to be balance responsible 
• Polluter must pay (if there are several BRPs on one node, other BRPs should be aware of the 
change in resource owner’s behaviour. 
• Independency (aggregators don’t need to associate to resources owners) 
Four different models allowing aggregation are developed and tested/to be tested in Pilots. Two of the 
models aim to test the independent aggregation concept. In the third model BRP (Balance Responsible 
Party) and the aggregator are the same entity. In the fourth model several BRPs are allowed on the same 
connected point. 
The paper discusses the advantages and the disadvantages of the developed modes.  
• Finally, it concludes that four topics should be looked into: 
• Lower minimum bid size 
• Allow aggregation of generation and demand in one bid 
• Information exchange toward TSO 
• Geographical issues and requirements for activation. 
 
Document: 24. DSO-TSO cooperation issues and solutions for distribution grid congestion 
management 
This paper first reviews the major congestion management methods based on energy system states (i.e. 
green, orange, and red, corresponding to the timeframe of day-ahead markets, balancing/congestion 
management and last resort curtailment). The congestion management approaches mentioned in the 
paper are congestion pricing (including explicit auctioning and implicit auctioning), redispatching, and 
curtailment. Following the review of the congestion management methods, current inter-TSOs 
cooperation on balancing and capacity allocation under each state of the energy system is presented. 
Moreover, the possible TSO-DSO cooperation is reviewed and presented in this paper, under by making 
reference to the same time frames (green, orange and red). 
With the increasing flexibility resources connected to the power grid, DSOs are becoming more active in 
managing the congestions at the distribution networks. This requires closer cooperation between TSO 
and DSO, especially considering capacity allocation at their borders. 
 The main interest for the SmartNet is the orange (and possibly red) system state which is related to re-
dispatch and possible curtailment (although in our case curtailment can be voluntary and thus regarded 
as somewhat part or the re-dispatch. In the reality SmartNet doesn’t treat the case of a curtailment 
carried out outside market mechanisms - but this would be more typical for the red time frame i.e. as a 
last resort when no market mechanisms have functioned properly). The paper covers a number of 
approaches used by TSO but also discusses their applicability or possible solutions for DSO and TSO-DSO 
cooperation. It also includes discussion on pricing approaches to include management of capacity 
currently used by TSO and discusses its applicability to DSO. 
What the paper doesn’t provide is a judgement of the different methodologies, which is mostly left to the 
reader (so it is more a review paper than a policy paper) 
  
Copyright 2019 SmartNet      Page 90  
 
 
 
Document: 25. CEER Position Paper on the Future DSO and TSO Relationship 
The document studies possible ways the TSO-DSOs might cooperate in order to provide more efficient 
system solutions, addressing the current market challenges like increased RES integration, demand side 
management, low -carbon generation target and so on. CEER suggests the following principles, which 
should serve as bases of the future TSO-DSO relationship: 
• Overarching principles 
According to CEER, TSOs and DSOs should construct mutually respectful relationship and that the 
effective cooperation among system operators, competitive markets can result optimal system outcomes. 
• Governance 
Continuous consultation among TSO, DSO and stakeholders should take place for a corresponding task. 
It is significant that, the TSO-DSO cooperation create incentives for both of them to optimize system 
outcomes as a whole. 
• Network Planning 
It is important to have shared information between TSO-DSO related to the network status to ensure least 
cost solutions, to avoid over and under investment. 
Strong TSO-DSO cooperation is crucial to long term network planning 
• System Operation 
Strong TSO-DSO cooperation can lead to increase the efficiencies in the system operation. 
Increased information share will give the possibility for TSO, DSO to have better knowledge of their 
networks, to investigate who has to act where in order to unbundle system flexibilities and support the 
system as a whole.  
It is important that the regulatory arrangements will support all mentioned above points. 
 
Document: 26. "Day-ahead and intraday markets – Operating Rules - Resolución de 23 de 
diciembre de 2015, de la Secretaría de Estado de Energía, por la que se aprueban las Reglas de 
funcionamiento de los mercados diario e intradiario de producción de energía eléctrica." 
Definition of the operating rules for the Spanish day-ahead and intraday markets. 
 
Document: 27. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 7.2 – Automatic Frequency Restoration 
Reserve."  
Spanish System Operator’s operating procedure. Definition of the ancillary service “Automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserve”. 
 
Document: 28. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 7.3 – Replacement Reserve" 
Spanish System Operator’s operating procedure. Definition of the ancillary service “Replacement 
Reserve”. 
 
Document: 29. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 3.2 – Technical Restrictions" 
Spanish System Operator’s operating procedure. Definition of the ancillary service “Technical 
restrictions”. 
 
Document: 30. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 3.1 – Generation scheduling" 
Spanish System Operator’s operating procedure. Definition of the generation scheduling. 
In this document the relationships between the existing markets can be identified: Gate closures, 
publication of requirements, assignation of bids, etc. 
 
Document: 31. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 9.0 – Exchanged information by the 
System Operator" 
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Spanish System Operator´s operating procedure. Definition of the exchanged information by the System 
Operator. 
 
Document: 32. "System Operator’s Operating procedure 7.4. Voltage control at transmission 
network" 
Spanish System Operator’s operating procedure. Definition of the ancillary service “Voltage control”. 
 
Document: 33. "Real Decreto 413/2014, de 6 de junio, por el que se regula la actividad de 
producción de energía eléctrica a partir de fuentes de energía renovables, cogeneración y 
residuos" 
Spanish Royal Decree 413/2014, of 6 June, which regulates the electricity production with renewable 
resources, cogeneration and wastes. 
 
Document: 34. DCO 354/2013-DCO 557/2013 - DCO 298/2016 
This is an overview of the Italian power system and thus different documents have been analysed: DCO 
354/2013, DCO 557/2013, DCO 298/2016, Italian network code, DCO 368/2013,DCO 300/2017, DCO 
798 2016, DCO 557/2013 
 
Document: 35. Open Networks Project: Opening Markets for Network Flexibility 2017 
achievements and future directions 
 
This report first sets out current background and challenges of the UK power system. It then briefly 
introduces the Open Networks project and its scope, including the achievements in 2017 and objectives 
to be achieved in 2018. It then emphasises that the project considers a whole electricity system context 
for both transmission and distribution network. The project is consist of 5 work streams, which are 
• Customer experience, that groups customers into different categories, reviews the current 
customer connection process, and etc. 
• Transition from DNO to DSO, that defines DSO and its functions, and potential markets that 
enable DSO services developed on the basis of SGAM. 
• Short-, Medium-, and long-term improvements and changes of transmission and distribution 
processes, e.g. investment planning and statement of works, based on current process. 
• Whole system charging reform with the transition from DNO to DSO, 
• Communications with stakeholders 
In addition, several case studies of projects carried out by system operators are briefly introduced in 
relation to the work of each stream.   
 
Document: 36. "USEF: WORKSTREAM ON AGGREGATOR IMPLEMENTATION MODELS: 
Recommended practices and key considerations for a regulatory framework and market design 
on explicit Demand Response" 
The document introduces and articulates seven aggregator implementation models: Integrated, Broker, 
Contractual, Uncorrected, Corrected, Central settlement, and Net benefit (a specific variant of the central 
settlement). Each of these models is described in terms of contractual relationships, balance 
responsibility, perimeter correction and transfer of energy.  
The study covers the commercial, industrial and residential segment. For the residential segment, where 
DR takes place on a daily basis, the study introduces a new set of models: reference profile models. These 
models have at their core the objective to ease the split of balance responsibility (by means of a separate 
baseline -likely different from the baseline to check delivery performance- to identify imbalance 
volumes). 
The document concludes with recommendations (advice that could be incorporated into a standardized 
contract) and considerations (options and implications) towards identified complexities for the 
implementation of these models. Such complexities are: 
• Measurement and validation 
• Baseline methodology 
• Information exchange and confidentiality 
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• Transfer of energy price methodology 
• Relationship between implicit and explicit DR 
• Rebound effect 
• Portfolio conditions    
More detailed explanations and specifications (including use cases) of the USEF framework are 
covered in two additional documents: 
• USEF: The Framework Explained 
• USEF: The Framework Specifications. 
Please note: Unless specified otherwise, the form summarises the document ‘USEF: Workstream on 
Aggregator Implementation Models: Recommended practices and key considerations for a regulatory 
framework and market design on explicit Demand Response’ (the version updated in Sept. 2017). A few 
learnings are coming from the document ‘USEF: The Framework Explained’ and ‘USEF: The Framework 
Specifications’, and that is explicitly mentioned. 
 
Document: 37. ANCILLARY SERVICES TO BE DELIVERED IN DENMARK TENDER CONDITIONS 
The document is describing the tender conditions relevant for a specific type of ancillary service in 
Denmark, specifically in Western Denmark (DK1) and Eastern Denmark (DK2). It is important to mention 
that the ancillary services mentioned in this document are provided by the individual players who have 
concluded an agreement about reserve capacity with Energinet.dk. 
So, this document does not consider a player who can refrain from concluding such an agreement, instead 
entering regulating power bids as he sees fit (using real-time trading). 
Energinet (Danish TSO) buys ancillary services to ensure access at all times to such resources as are 
necessary to ensure the stable and reliable electricity system operation. The ancillary services presented 
in the document are the followings; 
• Primary reserve, FCR 
• aFRR supply ability 
• Secondary reserve, aFRR 
• Manual reserve, mFRR 
• Frequency-controlled disturbance reserve, FCR-D 
• Frequency-controlled normal operation reserve, FCR-N 
Document: 38. MARKET REGULATIONS: Regulation A Principles for the electricity market 
The document describes the main principles for the Danish electricity market model, stating the main 
players in the electricity market, market places, the TSO’s commercial transactions and TSO’s tariffs. 
 
Document: 39. MARKET REGULATIONS: Regulation B Terms of electricity market access 
The document is describing all terms and conditions to access the electricity market for both consumers 
and producers. In addition, it includes a description of Energinet’ s electricity tariffs for producers and 
consumers.  
 
Document: 40. MARKET REGULATIONS: Regulation C1_Terms of balance responsibility 
The document summarizes the Danish regulation on and terms of balance responsibility.  The regulation 
is primarily aimed at market participants that have already signed or want to sign an agreement with 
Energinet.dk in order to become a balance responsible party (BRP). The regulation is also aimed at all 
parties which are basically qualified to become BRPs, balance suppliers, grid companies and electricity 
generators, as well as balance suppliers in general.  
Finally, the regulation also defines which information is required in order for Energinet.dk to carry out its 
tasks in relation to balance responsibility and which the market participants are therefore obliged to 
provide to Energinet.dk on request; see Section 84(5) of the Danish Electricity Supply Act2.   
This document does not cover those topics based on which we want to make the review for SmartNet. 
 
Document: 41. BALANCING MARKET: Regulation C2 The balancing market and balance settlement, 
Adjustment of market regulations 
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The document defines the balancing market and summarizes the regulations and rules related to the 
market players participation in the regulated power market. The Danish balancing market is grouped into 
a regulating power market and a balancing power market.  
In the regulated power market Energinet buys/sells the regulated power from/to players in the delivery 
hour. 
In the balancing power market, Energinet buys/sells balancing power from/to the market players to 
counterbalance imbalances incurred by them. 
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6.2 Organisations currently representing DSOs 
CEDEC CEDEC represents the interests of more than 1500 local and regional energy 
companies from ten European countries, serving 85 million electricity and gas 
customers and connections. These predominantly medium-sized local and regional 
energy companies have developed activities as electricity and heat generators, 
electricity and gas distribution grid and metering operators and energy (services) 
suppliers. The wide range of services provided by local utility companies is reliable, 
sustainable and close to the consumer. Through their high investments, they make a 
significant contribution to local and regional economic development. 
EDSO for Smart 
Grids 
European Distribution System Operators for Smart Grids (EDSO) gathers leading 
European electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) cooperating to bring smart 
grids from vision to reality. The development of smart grids is a prerequisite to 
reaching the EU's ambitious energy, climate, security of supply and internal market 
objectives. EDSO and its members are committed to taking on this huge challenge, 
while at the same time ensuring the reliability of Europe’s electricity supply to 
consumers and enabling them to take a more active part in our energy system. EDSO is 
a key interface between the DSOs and the European institutions, and is focused on 
RD&D, policy and member state regulation to support this development.  
EURELECTRIC EURELECTRIC represents the power sector in over 30 European countries, speaking 
for more than 3,500 companies in power generation, distribution, and supply. We also 
have affiliates and associates on several other continents. We stand for carbon-neutral 
electricity by 2050, competitive electricity for our customers, and continent-wide 
electricity through a coherent European approach. 
GEODE GEODE represents the interests of 1200 private and public energy companies for both 
electricity and gas from 16 European countries, serving more than 100 million 
customers. These small and medium-sized companies are bringing intelligence to the 
grids and making thereby a major contribution to achieve Europe’s climate and energy 
policy goals. GEODE promotes fair and competitive conditions for network operators 
giving them a strong voice to secure core values - namely providing a customer-
focused service, with a high quality of supply and energy efficiency to homes, 
businesses and local communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper reflects only the author’s view and the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) is not 
responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. 
 
